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1. INTRODUCTION 
I show that the “seven percent solution” persists to this day, based on my analysis of gross 
spreads of 1450 initial public offerings (‘IPOs’) in United States (‘U.S.’) and Europe from 
2008 to 2018. Originally documented by Chen and Ritter (2000) and confirmed by 
Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), the ‘7% solution’ refers to the U.S. gross spreads 
clustering at the exactly 7% level. I find that it is still present in the U.S. issues (IPOs), 
especially in the ‘Small’ $25 million to $100 million of total IPO proceeds class but can be 
found in other size classes as well. Despite not as extremely predominant as before, the 
proportion of 7.00% gross spreads is very high, on average greater than 80% in 2008-2018 
in the U.S. Small issues.  
The European median gross spreads remain significantly smaller compared 
with the U.S. ones during my sample period of 2008-2018. This difference varies between 
0.25% and 3.25%, even after controlling for all issue sizes, time periods and European 
national markets. However, a certain “3% wedge”, as coined by Abrahamson, Jenkinson and 
Jones (2011), no longer exists between U.S. and European issues. A striking example of the 
disparity between U.S. and European fees are the IPOs of Altice. Altice Europe went public 
on Euronext in 2014 with a 1.50% gross spread. Three years later, Altice USA, the exact 
same business but located in the U.S., was listed on NYSE in 2017 and had to pay a 3.30% 
gross spread instead, more than double what was demanded in Europe. 
 Considering the effects of different issue characteristics, I find that technology 
companies pay slightly higher gross spreads than their non-technology peers. This result is 
statistically significant and in line with results of Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011). 
This ‘technology effect’ is also present in the gross spreads of the IPOs of so-called 
‘unicorns’1, technology companies with issue sizes over $1000 million. They pay lower fees 
to the underwriters due to their exposure to the ‘size effect’ of larger issues that have smaller 
gross spreads, but, in the end, slightly higher than their similarly sized peers due to their 
exposure to the ‘technology effect’. Even the founder-managers of technology companies 
that retain control over the companies’ businesses seem to not be able to avoid paying the 
‘technology premium’. Also, contrary to expectations, founder-manager-controlled 
companies do not have similar success as with earlier investors when negotiating with the 
 
1 The term “unicorn”, originally meaning a start-up company with an over $1000 million valuation, was first 
coined by Cowboy Ventures founder Aileen Lee in her 2013 TechCrunch article “Welcome To The Unicorn 
Club: Learning From Billion-Dollar Startups.” and has remained in use ever since. 
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underwriters over the gross spreads, and do not achieve smaller gross spreads than their 
control group. Similar to the ‘7% solution’ and the difference between U.S. and European 
gross spreads, the results regarding different issue characteristics are also mostly consistent 
over time, issue size and different European markets on the national level.  
My thesis was motivated by the spectacular success the ‘FAANG2’ companies 
have had after the financial crisis of 2008-2009. One similarity between the FAANG 
companies is that their business decisions are still heavily influenced by their founder-
managers (excluding Apple’s), even after several funding rounds and the IPOs. This unusual 
attribute inspired me to investigate the effect of the founder-managers with controlling 
voting rights on their companies’ IPO fees. Moreover, the FAANG companies’ business 
models are largely based on valuable information produced by their extensive data 
collection. In broader context, these business models are based on networks enabled by 
modern information technology, on one way or another. The prominence of these companies 
has indisputably increased during the time after the financial crisis coinciding with and 
constituting for my sample period of 2008-2018. 
My research objective was to find out whether or not the significant negotiation 
power wielded by the founder-managers of companies whose business models are based 
social networks and enabled by modern information technology had affected the gross 
spreads charged by the organisers, the underwriters of IPOs. Moreover, I wanted to define if 
the clustering of the IPO fees observed previously both in the U.S. and Europe (e.g. Chen 
and Ritter (2000), Torstila (2003), Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011)) still persisted 
to this day, and on what levels the clustering took place, if it any longer took place. The 
focus of this thesis was on the U.S. and European IPO markets, both being the largest and 
most prominent financial markets of the world, and due to the availability of precise IPO 
data from both markets. The sample period that was selected was from 2008 to 2018, as the 
importance of the information and communication technology sector in the global economy 
had increased significantly after the financial crisis of 2008-2009, and would also most likely 
continue to do so in the foreseeable future (for example, Jorgenson and Khuong, 2016). 
Moreover, to some extent, I intended my thesis to be a follow-up study to the ones by 
Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) and Chen and Ritter (2000). Thus, my sample 
period complements their sample periods of 1998-2007 and 1985-1998, respectively.  
 
2 The ‘FAANG’ group are the U.S. companies Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix and Google (renamed to 
Alphabet in 2015). 
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Regarding methodology, my results were obtained with figurative, clustering 
and regression analysis. The regression analysis was done via multivariate ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression analysis on the gross spreads, with a model that followed the one 
used by Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011). With the regression analysis, I found out 
how the negotiation power of the founder-managers and other issue characteristics affected 
the gross spreads, the fees charged by IPO underwriters. When I evaluated the prior evidence 
available before conducting my analysis, I set the following hypotheses: 1) U.S. IPOs will 
have higher gross spreads (will be more expensive) than European ones, 2) IPOs with larger 
market capitalisations will have smaller gross spreads, 3) Technology IPOs will have smaller 
gross spreads than otherwise similar IPOs, 4) IPOs of companies controlled by founder-
managers will have smaller gross spreads than otherwise similar IPOs, and 5) IPOs of 
‘unicorn’ companies will have the smallest gross spreads. 
 The contribution of this study is to offer a deeper insight on how the significant 
negotiation power of the founder-managers of (technology) companies has affected the gross 
spreads of IPOs in the recent years. I seek to answer this question by utilising a hand-
collected sample of 84 IPOs of companies controlled by founder-managers before, and in 
some cases, also after the issue. Additionally, I produce updated data of the levels on which 
the gross spreads have been on the European and U.S. IPO markets during my sample period 
of 2008 to 2018, and how different issue characteristics have influenced the gross spreads. 
Previously, the study on IPO gross spreads has focused on the hypotheses of explicit or 
implicit collusion between the IPO underwriters. I am approaching the phenomenon of high 
IPO gross spreads clustering around certain levels from a new angle, motivated by the rise 
an economic system based on networks, and the powerful founder-managers of the star 
companies of this new economy. Therefore, this thesis contributes to the existing equity 
market research on IPOs and IPO fees.  
The thesis is structured as follows: In Section 1, I present the main results and 
discuss my contribution to existing research. In Section 2, I lay the background on the subject 
and review the most relevant literature about the clustering of the IPO fees. In Section 3, I 
set the hypotheses for this study based on prior research. In Section 4, I present the IPO gross 
spread data utilised in the analysis. In Section 5, I introduce the methodology of the thesis. 
In Section 6, I analyse and present the results. In Section 7, I compare the results vis-a-vis 
my hypotheses. Finally, Section 8 concludes the thesis.  
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2. LITERATURE 
In this section, I start by laying the background for my thesis topic, from which the 
motivation to study the potential effects of founder-managers’ negotiation power on the 
gross spreads is derived from. I explain the significance of the rising network economy and 
its star players, the huge technology-based ‘unicorn’ companies. I study the basis on which 
the strong negotiation power of the founder-managers is based on. Furthermore, I disclose 
how the fees and gross spreads of the initial public offerings (IPOs) are set by the organisers 
of the IPOs, the underwriters, after which prior evidence of the clustering of these gross 
spreads at certain integer levels is presented. Also, I dig into the proposed hypotheses and 
verified theories in earlier studies for the reasons behind this clustering. Finally, I recount 
the differences between European and U.S. IPO markets based on existing research. 
 
2.1. Background 
The idea to investigate the effect of founder-managers with controlling voting rights on the 
gross spreads of their companies’ IPOs came from the tremendous success the FAANG 
companies have had after the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Their success also coincides with 
the rise of a ‘new’ economic system based on collecting data and refining it into valuable 
information. The business models of these companies are based on networks enabled by 
modern information technology, on one way or another. Further, what is also special about 
these kind of ‘star’ companies, is the fact that many of the companies are still controlled by 
founder-managers after several funding rounds, that usually dilute the founders’ equity 
shares, and even after the companies’ public listing through an IPO. 
 
2.1.1. The post-industrial network economy 
Although the idea of a services and information-based economy was already presented in 
1974 by American professor Daniel Bell in his book “The coming of post-industrial society”, 
only today, 46 years after its publication, are we truly beginning to notice the true scale of 
changes our economy has underwent since then and which will most likely continue to take 
place in the foreseeable future. In the late 1990s, during the early build-up of the infamous 
dot-com bubble, the French sociologist Manuel Castells further analysed the importance of 
information and networks in the post-industrial economy in his trilogy of books “The rise of 
the network society” (first published in 1996-1998, 2nd largely revised edition published in 
2010). In his work, Castells (2010) explains how the economy will be based on and functions 
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through networks as opposed to individuals (i.e. corporations and consumers), which is 
enabled by modern information technology like the Internet.  
Nowadays most individuals living in the advanced economies are familiar with 
networks based on the modern information technology. For instance, according to the 
Internet World Stats (2020), 87% of Europeans and 95% of North Americans were using the 
Internet on a daily basis in December 2019. Moreover, the individuals in today’s society are 
increasingly using interactive platforms based on the Internet to communicate with their 
acquaintances and to find out and express their views on what is currently going on in the 
society as a whole. For example, the most world’s most popular social media platform 
Facebook had over 2.5 billion monthly active users in December 2019 (Statista, 2020). When 
comparing the number of Facebook’s monthly active users to the global world population of 
7.65 billion (April 2020 estimate, U.S. Census Bureau) we find out that nearly one in three 
people in the world are using a single social media platform. Contemplating this staggering 
number and the fact that Facebook is only one among the global social media platforms, the 
society in which we are living in starts to feel like a true network society. 
 
2.1.2. The star players of the new economy 
It is no secret that the social media platforms (and partially modern information technology 
itself) were not only developed to enable us to communicate with the people we are closest 
with. Constructing and developing global services functioning around the clock has a 
significant cost and the revenue side must come from somewhere to make the equation work. 
Contrary to the traditional revenue models where customers pay the service provider for the 
services provided to his benefit by the provider, the social media platforms create value by 
extracting information from the social media users’ behaviour in the service and by selling 
this information to third parties that are interested in the users’ hopes, dreams, beliefs and 
habits. The real customers of the social media platforms are the third parties, not the users 
themselves. In exchange of the information that the users bring about by acting in the social 
media network, they receive the service itself free of charge. This is how the basic business 
model of the social media platforms works, and as we have witnessed in the recent years, 
this business model has shown that it can be extremely profitable.  
The companies who practice this business model are vast, and the companies 
whose products and services enable the business model to function are, in the reality, even 
more numerous. However, some of them are among the most successful companies of the 
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world. Out of the current ten highest-valued public companies by market capitalisation, 
seven are associated with networks based on the modern information technology (FXSSI, 
2020), and out of these, five are US and two Chinese. They include older players established 
decades ago, like Microsoft and Apple, and new stars like Amazon, Alphabet (Google), 
Facebook, Tencent and Alibaba. Whether they provide platforms (Facebook, Tencent, 
Alibaba), software (Alphabet, Microsoft) or devices (Apple) to the individuals that form the 
networks, they are all integral parts of the post-industrial network economy.  
Furthermore, what is even more special about the new star companies, in 
addition to their huge market capitalisations, are their ownership structures and the amount 
of control the founder-managers still exercise over their businesses, even after several 
funding rounds and the IPOs. In many cases, the founder-managers still hold the voting 
majority, which is very unusual for companies of this size, especially in the U.S. (e.g. 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2009). For example, the two founders of Snap Inc., a ‘camera’ 
company listed on NYSE with a market cap of $23.03 billion, Evan Spiegel (CEO) and 
Robert Murphy (CTO) together hold 100% of the voting power (Snap Inc., 2020). Though 
an extreme example, Snap is not alone out in the field. Facebook’s founder-manager and 
current CEO Mark Zuckerberg currently retains 53.1% of the total voting rights (Facebook 
Inc., 2020), while Alphabet’s founder-managers Larry Page (CEO) and Sergey Brin 
(President) possess 53.1% of all votes (Alphabet Inc., 2019). Thus, the founder-managers 
certainly have been able to preserve their control of the companies throughout time and 
financing rounds while even successfully publicly listing their companies to major stock 
exchanges. 
 
2.2. Voting rights, negotiation power and IPOs 
From a retail investor’s perspective, the majority control of the founder-managers could be 
seen as additional risk when considering whether to participate in an IPO or not. For 
example, Masulis, Wang and Xie (2009) find that in companies in which there is divergence 
between the voting and cash flow rights of different share classes, the corporate cash 
holdings are worth less to outsider shareholders, while (founder-manager) CEOs earn higher 
compensation and make overpriced acquisitions more often. In addition, they confirm that 
CEOs with majority control rights, but no majority cash flow rights, are more likely seek 
private benefits at shareholders’ expense. In the IPO context, Smart and Zutter (2003) find 
that in IPOs with dual-class shares there is less underpricing (i.e. the difference between the 
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price per share in the IPO and the closing price on the first day of trading in the stock 
exchange) than in single share class IPOs. After the IPOs, they find that the nonvoting shares 
of dual-class-share-companies trade at lower prices relative to earnings and sales compared 
with the shares of single-class companies. Thus, it seems that investors are adding ‘voting 
premium’ to their discounts rates, leading to lower valuations of companies with separated 
voting and cash flow rights.  
Even though the founder-managers have been able to preserve their control 
(and protect their private benefits in some cases), after the IPOs at the expense of outsider 
shareholders, not much has been said about their respective “negotiation power” relative to 
the organisers of the IPOs themselves, the underwriters. Generally speaking, the fees charged 
by the underwriters (i.e. gross spreads) have remained at surprisingly constant levels 
throughout time. Already in 2000, over 20 years ago, Chen and Ritter (2000) found out that 
in more than 90% of medium-sized U.S. IPOs ($20-80 million) in 1995-1998, the gross 
spreads charged by the underwriters were exactly seven percent, calling this finding “the 
seven percent solution”. Ten years later, Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) further 
confirm that the phenomenon of IPO gross spreads clustering around almost exactly 7% has 
become even more common in the U.S. and spread to larger IPOs up to $250 million. 
Moreover, clustering of IPO fees has been observed to also take place in Europe, though on 
lower levels by (e.g. Torstila (2003)).  This seems rather odd, especially when no evidence 
of collusion between underwriters in the U.S. markets has been uncovered to this day.  
To conclude, it seems that on one hand the founder-managers of large 
companies with business models affiliated with the social networks based on modern 
information technology have been able to preserve their control over their companies even 
after the companies have become the highest-valued publicly traded companies in the world, 
while simultaneously expressing significant negotiation power over the outside investors 
financing the growth on many occasions. On the other hand, the underwriters in charge of 
organising the last stage of the companies’ financing cycle, the IPO, have been able to charge 
hefty fees from companies seeking public listings in the past, especially in the U.S., similarly 
exercising major negotiation power. Thus, it seems that the both founder-managers and the 
underwriters possess great negotiation power relative to their counterparties, outside 
investors for founder-managers and the companies going public for the underwriters. 
However, what will happen if we fuse these two things together? What would happen in a 
situation in which the founder-managers are looking to publicly list their company with the 
help of the underwriters? 
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2.3. IPO fees and gross spreads 
The initial public offerings, or IPOs in short, have been a popular research topic in finance 
in the past decades. Popular research topics have been why IPOs are constantly underpriced 
(e.g. Ljungqvist (2007)) and why there is cyclicality in IPOs through time (e.g. Lowry and 
Schwert (2002)) and the performance of the companies going public after their IPOs (e.g. 
Jain and Kini (1994)). Overall analyses of IPOs have also been done, for example by Ritter 
and Welch (2002), who assess IPOs from several perspectives: why are companies going 
public, why is there underpricing in the IPO subscription prices, and how do the companies 
that went public perform after their IPOs. The fees charged by the underwriters, the ones 
organising the IPOs, and their clustering around certain levels have also been studied Chen 
and Ritter (2000), Ritter (2003), Torstila (2003) and more recently by Abrahamson, 
Jenkinson and Jones (2011). 
As described before, the gross spread of an IPO is the compensation to the 
organiser of the IPO, the underwriter, paid by the company going public. In a sense, the 
underwriters are third parties evaluating the risk associated with the IPO in exchange for a 
fee and are responsible for the practical execution of the IPO. The gross spread is calculated 
as a percentage of the total proceeds collected in the IPO, i.e. the issue size. The gross spread, 
according to e.g. Ritter (1987), covers different types of underwriting costs, including 
management fees, underwriting fees and selling concessions, to mention a few. However, it 
is not equal to the costs of organising the IPO, and instead represents the compensation the 
underwriter receives for its services. In addition to the gross spread, according to Ritter 
(1987), the issuing company has to also pay other fixed costs, e.g. legal and other 
administrative fees. In my thesis, the focus is on the levels on which the gross spreads are 
set, as a result of negotiations between the underwriter and the company, and not on the cost 
structure behind the IPO fees. 
 
2.4. Clustering of the IPO gross spreads 
The clustering of IPO fees was first widely publicised after The Journal of Finance published 
the article “The Seven Percent Solution” by Chen and Ritter in 2000 who found that the 
gross spreads (i.e. the IPO fees) charged by the underwriters (i.e. the parties evaluating the 
risk associated with the IPO in exchange for a fee) are oddly consistent and cluster around 
the seven percent level in the U.S. financial markets. Evaluating this in the context of the 
basic theory on efficient markets, it intuitively seems very unlikely that the underwriters (the 
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‘suppliers’) would set their price on an exact same numerical value, if they would be pricing 
their services according to their own best interest to maximise profit without colluding with 
their competitors to establish a price cartel to further push up the profits. Even then, the 
incentive to break the cartel by setting prices slightly below the level agreed with the 
competition remains, as the underwriter pricing below the agreed-upon-level would 
drastically expand its market share and ultimately its profits at the expense of the other 
underwriters. Thus, a price cartel should not form on efficient markets in the first place, and 
even if it did, it would eventually collapse given the built-in instabilities due to the economic 
incentives to break the cartel explained by game theory (see e.g. Leslie (2005)).  
 Chen and Ritter (2000) offer several potential explanations for the observed 
clustering of the gross spreads. They propose 1) explicit collusion, 2) strategic pricing, 3) 
agency costs, 5) other forms of compensation, 6) resale price maintenance and 7) cross-
subsidisation as potential explanations of the clustering at the seven percent level. 
Ultimately, they end up arguing against most of these, including ruling explicit collusion 
based on the large number of people involved in setting the fees (making it difficult for 
everyone to collude together in secret) and the legal liabilities as deterrents. Chen and Ritter 
(2000) offer strategic pricing as the most likely explanation. They propose that the 
individuals involved are forecasting future spreads based on what they are doing today and 
then set the spreads (i.e. prices) accordingly, resulting in each underwriter setting the spreads 
well above competitive levels. Moreover, they see that the strategic pricing is sustainable 
because the issuing firms are not choosing underwriters only based on the spreads, but the 
spreads are part of wider criteria on which the underwriters are evaluated. Thus, according 
to Chen and Ritter (2000), no explicit collusion is required to sustain the high levels of fees.
 This strategic pricing explanation was later contested by several studies, 
notably by Hansen in 2001 and Torstila in 2003. Hansen (2001) finds that the U.S. IPO 
market is not concentrated and that the barriers of entry are low. He also finds the seven 
percent gross spreads not abnormally profitable while noting their persistence even after 
public investigations, further indicating against the existence of collusive practices. Hansen 
(2001) concludes that the seven percent gross spreads are part of the “industry standard” and 
the actual competition takes place on quality, for example on underwriter reputation. 
Moreover, Torstila (2003) finds that although there is clear clustering not only in the U.S. 
but also in other IPO markets as well, the clustering is more common in markets in which 
the gross spreads are lower than in markets that the gross spreads are higher, though this 
should be other way around if any collusion would be taking place. With company-level 
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data, he also confirms Hansen’s (2001) earlier result of the seven percent gross spreads not 
being abnormally profitable. Thus, considering the evidence presented by Hansen (2001) 
and Torstila (2003), the clustering of IPO gross spreads seems to not be caused by collusion 
between underwriters, as one would initially think. 
More recently, Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) return to the subject 
and study the persistence of clustering of the U.S. gross spreads at the seven percent level. 
They found that the clustering at 7% level detected before Chen and Ritter (2000) in the $25 
million - $100 million range had also extended to IPOs in $100 million - $500 million range, 
with 65% of all gross spreads in this range being equal to 7%. They argue that the increasing 
prevalence of exactly 7% gross spreads in the larger IPOs, while simultaneously the 
European underwriters entered the U.S. markets and the general volumes of IPOs fell, both 
of which should decrease the fees, not increase them, is in line with implicit collusion 
models. Thus, Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) see the strategic pricing i.e. implicit 
collusion as the most feasible explanation of U.S. gross spreads clustering around the seven 
percent level. Moreover, they state that the present value of future profits in the long run is 
larger than the profits in the short run that would result from decreasing gross spread in order 
to gain more market share. According to them, this gives the underwriters no incentive to 
compete on the spreads. 
 
2.5. Differences between European and U.S. IPO markets 
Some of the papers published on the clustering of IPO gross spreads also study the 
differences between U.S. and European IPO markets, and studies focusing entirely on 
European markets have also been done (e.g. Torstila (2001)). Generally speaking, the gross 
spreads are higher in the U.S., clustering around the 7% level (Chen and Ritter (2000); 
Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011)) and that there is clustering in the European 
markets as well, although on a lower 3-4% level, depending on the country (Torstila, 2001 
and 2003). Interestingly, Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) find that there is a “3% 
wedge” between the pricing, partially by the same banks, of IPOs in the U.S. and Europe not 
explained by outside factors like issue characteristics. However, in some national markets, 
there seems to be no clustering. For example, Chen, Fok and Wang (2006) find no clustering 
patterns in gross spreads in the Taiwanese markets during 1989-1999, but this can partially 
be explained by the different fee structure of the Taiwanese market. 
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In addition to the average levels of fees, there are also other differences 
between the U.S. and European IPO markets. For example, the processes on how the listing 
is completed and how the issue price is set are differing in the two markets. According to 
Ritter (2003), in the U.S. the book-building method has always been the most prominent 
one, while in Europe the mechanisms have been more variable. In a book-built IPO, the 
underwriter collects orders that include price and number of shares desired from several 
institutional investors, referred to as book-building.  Moreover, Ritter (2003) lists the fixed 
price method, the auction method and the book-building method as ones that are commonly 
used in Europe. Out of these, IPOs conducted using the book-building typically have the 
highest gross spreads (Ritter, 2003). According to Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), 
the other methods of conducting the IPOs are especially popular in smaller issues in Europe. 
As for other markets characteristics, the differences between European and 
U.S. IPO markets are not so significant. In an effort to explain the differences between the 
U.S. and European gross spreads, Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) recount other 
potential differences in market characteristics between the U.S. and Europe in the process. 
They find that for legal expenses, there are some differences between the two, but these 
differences are not significant enough to explain the difference in gross spreads. However, 
it must be noted that as the legal systems for the European markets are not uniform at the 
national level, the legal expenses also most likely vary between European countries as well. 
Furthermore, according to Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), the litigation risks, 
quality of analyst coverage or indirect costs of underpricing do not explain the difference in 
gross spreads between U.S. and European issues. Thus, according to prior evidence, it can 
be concluded that the U.S. and European IPO markets do not differ from each other in market 
characteristics in a way that would affect the levels of gross spreads, that otherwise would 
create bias to my study.  
 18 
 
3. HYPOTHESES 
My hypotheses are derived partially from the evidence shown by existing research on gross 
spreads of the initial public offerings in the European and U.S. markets, and partially from 
the proposed theory on how the negotiation power of founder-managers could affect the 
gross spreads charged by the underwriters of the IPOs. I will also test if technology 
companies, with business models based on modern information technology, are also able to 
publicly list themselves while paying lower fees to the underwriters, and how the ‘founder-
manager’ and ‘technology’ effects are working when combined. Additionally, the IPO gross 
spreads charged from the largest technology companies with market capitalisations3 
exceeding one billion U.S. dollars, the ‘unicorns’, are subject to analysis.  
Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) find that 1) European IPOs are 
cheaper than U.S., even after controlling for market capitalisation, IPO characteristics, time 
period and country effects and that 2) the gross spreads of larger IPOs are lower in both 
Europe and the U.S. The existence of both these factors has already been confirmed before 
them by e.g. Ritter (2003) and Torstila (2003). Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) 
also find that technology companies faced slightly higher fees during their sample period. 
However, I propose that this would no longer be the case and that the effect has actually 
reversed thereafter. Moreover, based on the evidence on how the founder-managers of 
technology companies have been able to preserve control over their companies throughout 
several financing rounds and IPOs, I propose that they could be able to utilise their increased 
negotiation power in the bargaining processes over IPO gross spreads with the underwriters, 
similarly as they have been clearly able to do with the investors in previous funding rounds. 
Thus, I will set my hypotheses as follows: 
H1: U.S. IPOs will have higher gross spreads (will be more expensive) than European ones 
H2: IPOs with larger market capitalisations will have smaller gross spreads 
H3: Technology IPOs will have smaller gross spreads than otherwise similar IPOs 
H4: IPOs of companies controlled by founder-managers will have smaller gross spreads than 
.otherwise similar IPOs 
H5: IPOs of “Unicorn” companies will have the smallest gross spreads 
 
3 The ‘market capitalisation’ of a publicly listed company is defined as the total market value of shares 
outstanding. It is calculated by multiplying the number of shares outstanding with the current market price of 
the shares and is commonly used as a measure of the ‘size’ of the company.  
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The first hypothesis is set to confirm if the fees charged by the underwriters in 
the U.S. still remain on significantly higher levels than in Europe, as observed before by 
Ritter (2003) and Torstila (2003) and later by Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011). I 
will also test the persistence of the “7% solution” originally found by Chen and Ritter in 
2000 and further confirmed by Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones in 2011. Earlier, Chen and 
Ritter (2000) found that in over 90% of the U.S. IPOs in which total proceeds were $20 
million - $80 million, the gross spreads charged by the underwriters were exactly 7%. A 
decade later, Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) found a similar clustering pattern: 
again, in over 90% of U.S. IPOs with total proceeds of $25 million - $100 million the gross 
spreads were exactly 7%. As noted earlier, they even found that the clustering at 7% level 
had spread to larger offerings in $100 million - $500 million range, with 65% of all gross 
spreads in this range being equal to 7%. However, Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) 
found no significant clustering in European IPOs on any particular level. 
The second hypothesis will show if there is still inverse relationship between 
company size (measured by the company’s market capitalisation) and gross spread as 
observed before. The relationship is most likely a result of the economies of scale related to 
larger offerings from the underwriters’ perspective, resulting in more competitive pricing on 
larger IPOs. Both Chen and Ritter (2000) and Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) find 
strong evidence about this inverse relationship. It is also somewhat intuitive to assume that 
companies with larger market capitalisations are being charged lower fees by the 
underwriters: given the fixed legal and administrational costs associated with every public 
offering resulting from the IPO legislation and the percentage-based IPO fees received by 
the underwriter(s), a larger IPO should always be more profitable to underwrite, if the fee 
percentage stays the same. This is known by both the companies seeking public listing and 
the underwriter, and thus it should also be reflected in the final IPO fees, the gross spreads. 
Moreover, based on the same logic, a larger company should also have more leverage in the 
fee negotiations with potential underwriters, resulting in lower gross spreads.  
The third hypothesis will test the technology effect observed before by 
Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011). They find that IPOs of technology companies 
have slightly higher gross spreads than non-technology ones but offer no explanation to this 
result. However, since their sample covers the pre-financial crisis period of 1998-2007 and 
includes the dot-com bubble  of 1998-2000 and its aftermath, it can be theorised that the 
underwriters at the time, with the excesses of the dot-com bubble in recent memory, would 
have demanded somewhat higher fees to cover the perceived higher risk associated with 
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technology companies going public. Thus, the higher fees charged from technology 
companies in 1998-2007 could be explained by the underwriters’ pricing policies affected 
by their experiences during the dot-com bubble and its aftermath. The sample period of 
Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) also predates the true breakthrough of the FAANG 
companies and the social network-based business models. Considering these thoughts, I 
hypothesise that the technology effect observed by Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) 
will now work the other way around, resulting in technology IPOs facing lower fees than 
non-technology IPOs. 
The purpose of the fourth hypothesis is to test whether the negotiation power 
of the founder-managers exercising effective control over their companies truly affects the 
ability of underwriters to charge high gross spreads. The hypothesis is set to test the logic 
behind the proposed theory of founder-managers’ increased negotiation power. If the 
founder-managers repeat the prior success they had in negotiations with the investors 
participating in earlier funding rounds, their companies should be able to complete their IPOs 
while paying lower fees. Thus, I suggest that the companies controlled by founder-managers 
will end up paying lower fees than their otherwise similar peers. However, on the other side 
of the negotiation table will be sitting the investment bankers, who for their part have been 
able to charge high fees before. The result will show who ultimately ends up saying the last 
word in the negotiations over the gross spreads.   
The fifth and last hypothesis concerns the special ‘unicorn’ companies. It 
combines the previously proven inverse relationship between company size and gross spread 
with the technology effect explained before. It is meant to capture and measure the effects 
of hypotheses two and three working simultaneously and see if this ‘double’ effect results in 
the smallest IPO fees. Again, considering prior evidence, technology companies going 
public have faced slightly higher fees (Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones, 2011) but given 
the characteristics of their sample period, I hypothesise that things have now turned around 
for technology companies. Combining this with the economies of scale associated with 
larger issues that should be at their strongest with these huge IPOs, I expect that the 
“unicorn” companies with over $1000 million market capitalisations and business models 
based on technology to pay the smallest fees to the underwriters.  
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4. DATA 
In order to test the hypotheses set in Section 3, a sample of good quality initial public offering 
(IPO) data was required. Also, to ensure the credibility of the results obtained later on, the 
data sample was also required to be of sufficient size. The data selection and filtering 
processes were constructed on top of the foundation laid down by these two requirements. 
Through data selection, I retrieved a sample of raw data containing 4515 U.S. and European 
observations (IPOs) from the years 2008-2018 from the Securities and Data Company (SDC) 
Platinum Database. The selected sample period follows and slightly overlaps the sample 
period 1998-2007 of Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011). The European observations 
included IPOs from the United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Russia, France and other 
less prominent European markets. The distribution of the IPOs that were included in the 
analysis after filtering and removal of missing observations is visualised in Appendix 1.  
The raw data retrieved from SDC was then filtered through three levels of 
filters to preserve comparability with earlier results, mainly to the results of Abrahamson, 
Jenkinson and Jones (2011). First, all non-book-built IPOs were excluded. Second, a cut-off 
threshold based on the issue size was set on $25 million U.S. dollars, and all IPOs below the 
threshold were left out. Third, issues were excluded based on the ‘standard exclusions’, that 
are commonly used in IPO research according to Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011). 
Finally, all observations for which gross spread data was not available, were removed from 
the sample. The resulting ‘Full’ sample consisted of 1450 U.S. and European IPOs.  
 
4.1. Issues with data quality and availability  
For the sake of data quality and availability, I only utilised data from European and U.S. 
IPOs4. Especially for the U.S., the gross spread data can be easily obtained from the SDC 
Platinum database and it is available for almost every IPO (1543 out of 1581).  However, 
even for Europe, the gross spread data is a lot more difficult to obtain from SDC as only 
24% (317 out of 1301) of European IPOs include gross spread data. On the contrary to the 
U.S., the gross spreads are generally not required to be listed on the prospectuses, and thus 
are not available in SDC. The same issue was already encountered by Abrahamson, 
Jenkinson and Jones in 2011, and still exists today even with newer data (2008-2018) from 
 
4 The nationality of the IPO is defined by as the ‘domicile nation’ variable in SDC data, meaning the country 
where the business is incorporated; in almost all cases this also matches the nationality of the stock exchange 
where the company is primarily listed. 
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SDC. As a result, the data sample for European IPOs obtained from SDC is significantly 
smaller than the U.S. dataset. However, the potential sampling issue is mitigated by the fact 
that the European IPOs omitted were somewhat evenly spread over time, size and different 
countries, preserving the representativeness of the European sample as a whole, although a 
larger sample would always be preferred in principle.   
The same availability problem is encountered with other markets as well.  Even 
though it would have been very interesting to include data from alternative markets as well, 
e.g. China and Japan given the large number of interesting technology IPOs in the both, 
unfortunately this would have required too much time and effort in contrast to the magnitude 
of the task, in addition to the fact that the U.S. and European IPO markets are the most 
prominent in the world. Moreover, the Asian financial markets are very different by nature 
when compared to Europe and U.S., creating potential for comparability issues. For example, 
in the Taiwanese markets (although Taiwan as a society is organised in a more Western-
orientated way than e.g. China) the IPO underwriting fees have been found to be much lower 
than in Western markets, and for example Chen, Fok and Wang (2006) find that the average 
gross spread in Taiwan is only 0.99%. They explain this strikingly low figure, compared to 
U.S. and European markets, with different incentives from the underwriters’ perspective: the 
underwriters’ main revenue comes from processing fees and capital gains instead of gross 
spreads, giving them incentive to maximise the issue size and try to emulate it with low 
underwriting fees.  
 
4.2. Data filtering process 
To preserve comparability with earlier results, the raw sample of 4515 IPOs (‘observations’) 
was filtered, in similar fashion to both Chen and Ritter (2000), and Abrahamson, Jenkinson 
and Jones (2011), boiling down to 1450 observations constituting the ‘Full’ sample. This 
data filtering process is visualised in Appendix 1. The first filter is related to the way in 
which the IPO is conducted. In line with Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), all IPOs 
conducted by other methods than book-building are excluded from the analysis. As they 
have already noted earlier, the IPOs conducted by other methods than book-building have 
different fee structures and pricing. Would these be included in the analysis, it would also 
endanger the feasibility of the results. Filtering out other than book-built IPOs, this leaves 
us with 3787 observations. 
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The second filter comes from the issue size, which is measured as the sum of 
total proceeds in all markets5. Similar to Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), I will 
use the $25 million market capitalisation valuation as a cut-off threshold and include no IPOs 
below the $25 million threshold or those with no issue size data available (only three 
observations). According to Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), the small issues 
below $25 million are suffering from diseconomies of scale, thus facing significantly higher 
fees, and may include underwriter warrants. This also links up with the inclusion of IPOs 
conducted exclusively by the book-building method. IPOs smaller than $25 million are 
commonly done by auction or fixed price methods in Europe while the U.S., the book-
building method is used almost exclusively (e.g. Ritter (2003)). After size filtering, 2882 
observations remain.  
The third and final filter are the ‘standard exclusions’ of the IPO research, 
according to Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011): all closed-end funds, blank check 
companies, special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), real estate investment trusts 
(REITs), unit offerings, and offerings with only depositary receipts are excluded. These 
exclusions are mainly based on the fact that the ones mentioned above are not ‘regular’ 
companies seeking financing and valuation through the stock market; their purpose of public 
listing has more to do with the aim of easing capital flows in and out of the company or 
acquisition purposes. In total, 410 IPOs are omitted from the sample based on these standard 
exclusions. Lastly, all observations for which there is no gross spread data available, are 
removed from the sample. In total, I removed 1022 observations from the sample, including 
984 European and 38 U.S. ones, due to missing gross spread data. After the three filters have 
been applied and the missing observations have been removed, the final full sample consists 
of 1450 IPOs, 1178 U.S. and 272 European ones.  
 
5 The total amount of proceeds in all markets is defined as the sum of proceeds in different markets. In case 
of the same company is simultaneously seeking listing to two or more markets, the total issue size is the sum 
of issues on each market 
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5. METHODS 
The methodology of my thesis closely follows the methodology of earlier studies on the 
subject, to ensure that the results of my thesis are feasible and comparable to earlier results. 
The two main reference used in constructing the methodology is the ‘preceding’ study by 
Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), and to some extent, the one by Chen and Ritter 
(2000). My methods are also similar to methods used in earlier research regarding the gross 
spreads of initial public offerings, for example by Chen and Ritter (2000), Torstila (2001) 
and Torstila (2003). To examine the determinants of the gross spreads, a multivariate 
regression model is utilised, resembling the model used by Abrahamson, Jenkinson and 
Jones (2011). Moreover, my methodology includes the subsampling and classification of the 
IPO data, also conducted in accordance with the preceding studies. However, an additional 
‘unicorn’ class is added to the classification. Further, unlike any study before, I include two 
founder-manager dummy variables in my regression model to help uncover if the powerful 
founder-managers are able to negotiate lower gross spreads from the underwriters. 
 
5.1. The gross spread model 
To measure the IPO fees collected by the underwriters, in the form of gross spreads of the 
IPOs, I employ a multivariate regression model as shown in Figure 1. The model will be an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression gross spread model that resembles the earlier model 
used by Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011). The dependent variable will be gross 
spread (as a percentage of the total amount of proceeds in the IPO) and the independent 
variable the proceeds, the investors’ contributions to the initial public offering, collected by 
the underwriter(s), on a natural logarithmic scale. The use of a logarithmic scale is a common 
method that aims to minimise the effect of large outliers on the results and enables us to 
detect variation on multiple scales at once. The use of a logarithmic scale is also in line with 
Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) and with earlier IPO research (e.g. Chen and Ritter 
(2000), Torstila (2001) and Torstila (2003)).  
The gross spread model includes dummy variables for technology (to sort out 
technology IPOs from other IPOs), privatisations and book-builder syndicates (multiple 
book-runners). Differing from the model used by Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones in 2011, 
the ‘venture capital’ dummy variable is omitted from the analysis. This is due to difficulties 
in obtaining consistent data about the venture capitalist backing in the IPOs. Most 
importantly, two ‘founder-manager’ dummy variables and one ‘unicorn’ dummy variable 
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are added. In the case of voting power being in founder-managers’ hands, the founder-
manager (‘F-M’) dummy is utilised to isolate the effect of founder managers’ negotiation 
power on IPO fees. In a similar founder-managerial control situation, but except for the 
company being a technology company (according to SCD), the founder-manager-technology 
(‘F-M-T’) dummy is used instead. This is done in order to better study the founder-manager 
and technology effects, both separately and playing together when combined. The unicorn 
dummy is included to inspect the IPO gross spreads faced by the huge technology-based 
unicorn companies. Moreover, I will include year dummies to isolate the possible yearly 
seasonality as well as country dummies for the more significant European markets (United 
Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Russia and France) to inspect the country-specific effects 
on IPO fees. 
 
Figure 1. The multivariate gross spread model.  
The regression model used resembles the model used by Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011). The most 
significant differences are the addition of the founder-manager dummy variables, the addition of the unicorn 
dummy and the omitting of the venture capital dummy. Furthermore, the country dummies differ to some 
extent from the ones used by Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011). 
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5.2. Subsampling and classification 
In order to compare the fees charged by U.S. underwriters with the fees charged by European 
ones, the full sample of 1450 IPOs was divided into two subsamples, one for European and 
one for U.S. IPOs. To measure the effect of economies of scale on the fees charged by the 
underwriters, the two samples were also further divided into smaller subsamples according 
to the market capitalisation of the IPO. This classification was also applied to the combined 
(U.S. and Europe) ‘Full’ sample. Chen and Ritter (2003) use two size classes for IPOs, $20-
80 million and over $80 million, while Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) use three 
size classes for IPOs:  $25-100 million, $100-500 million and over $500 million. In my 
research, I added two size classes to their framework: the over $1000 million market 
capitalisation class and the over $1000 million ‘unicorn’ class, with the additional 
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requirement of the IPO being a technology one6. The 23 unicorn flagged IPOs are presented 
in Appendix 4. In this way, the gross spreads of the unicorn IPOs can be compared with the 
gross spreads otherwise similarly sized IPOs. Hence, I will use the following five classes for 
the IPOs: $25-100 million (‘Small’), $100-500 million (‘Medium’), $500-1000 million 
(‘Large’), over $1000 million (‘Huge’) and the over $1000 million unicorn class (‘Unicorn’). 
 
5.3. Founder-manager flagging 
The founder-manager flagging of IPOs was done via online searching and to some extent, 
going through the prospectuses of the IPOs. For example, news articles from Bloomberg and 
the prospectuses filed on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) were used to 
obtain information about the voting power of the founder-managers. This proved to be very 
time-consuming, but in the end I was able to identify 84 IPOs where the founder-manager(s) 
were in absolute control7 before and in some cases even after the IPO. The hand-collected 
sample of founder-manager flagged IPOs is presented in Appendix 3. The 84 IPOs included 
56 technology founder-manager IPOs (F-M-T = 1), and the IPOs could also be divided to 81 
U.S. ones and 3 European (Russian) ones.  The Council of Institutional Investors (CII) “Dual 
Class Companies List” proved to be a helpful reference (for the U.S. data) in the process. 
 
5.4. Trustworthiness of the study 
The usage of similar methods and research practices as in earlier studies ensures the general 
trustworthiness of my thesis. Main reference points are the studies by Abrahamson, 
Jenkinson and Jones (2011) and Chen and Ritter (2003). In order to ensure the feasibility of 
my analysis and the comparability with earlier results, I closely follow similar methodology 
and research practices as they do. Moreover, the data selection and the data filtering process, 
as described in Section 4, are carried out in a way that intends to minimise bias in the final 
sample. Finally, a wide-ranging selection of control variables are made use of in the 
regression analysis, to make sure that the results are consistent over e.g. different issue sizes 
and yearly time periods. In the technical part of the analysis, the guide written by Sheppard 
(2018) provided useful assistance. 
 
6 The dummy variable Technology = 1, when the IPO receives a non-void value of the ‘High Tech Industry’ 
variable in the SDC Platinum database. 
7 Absolute control means that the one(s) in control retain over 50% of the total votes outstanding. In case of 
dual-class shares, this does not always mean that the one(s) in control must hold over 50% of the total equity.  
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6. RESULTS 
The results are based on as analysis of U.S. and European initial public offerings from 2008 
to 2018. The majority of the sample consists of U.S. initial public offerings, with almost four 
out of five IPOs being from the U.S., and which is strongly reflected in the results. To 
alleviate the likely bias resulting from this, the sample was divided to U.S. and European 
subsamples. Both subsamples, along with the combined U.S. and European ‘Full’ sample, 
were then further divided into classes relative to the amount of proceeds collected in the IPO, 
resulting in four size classes and an additional ‘unicorn’ class. Then, a data filtering process 
as described in Section 4, was followed to preserve comparability with earlier results, mainly 
with the results of Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), and to some extent, Chen and 
Ritter (2003) and Torstila (2003).  Also, there was the necessary task to clean the data of 
missing and incorrectly inserted information. Now, through formatting, visualisation and 
regression analysis, I will refine the cleaned and classified data into actual results.  
 
6.1. Figurative analysis 
The figurative analysis reveals that the results are strongly affected by the ratio of U.S. versus 
European IPOs, and that most of IPOs fall in the two lowest size classes. It also indicates 
that the clustering of U.S. gross spreads at the 7% level persists. Moreover, the ‘size effect’, 
due to which IPO fees decrease as the issue size increases, is clearly detectable from my 
sample. In the case of the ‘unicorn’ companies, it can be deduced that they face slightly 
higher gross spreads than their similarly sized non-technology peers. In every size class and 
throughout the sample period of 2008-2018, U.S. IPOs have substantially higher gross 
spreads than European ones. This is true for all cases except for the ‘Small’ size class that 
includes IPOs with total proceeds from $25-100 million U.S. dollars, and in which U.S. gross 
spreads are only slightly higher. 
The classification of the full sample of 1450 U.S. and European IPOs is 
illustrated in Table 1. The sample is divided into three categories; the U.S. subsample (1178 
observations), the European subsample (272 observations) and the ‘Full’ sample of 1450 
observations. For all categories, the number of IPOs (the counts), arithmetic averages and 
medians of both the gross spreads and total amounts of proceeds per IPO are listed.  
Moreover, the sample is divided into size classes relative to the total amount of proceeds of 
the IPOs. Panel B lists the ‘Small’ IPOs with total proceeds from $25 million to $100 million, 
which is also the corresponding sample in which Chen and Ritter (2000) and Abrahamson, 
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Jenkinson and Jones (2011) found over 90% of the U.S. gross spreads to be exactly 7%.  
Panel lists C the ‘Medium’ IPOs with total proceeds from $100 million to $500 million and 
Panel D lists the ‘Large’ IPOs with total proceeds from $500 million to $1000 million. 
Furthermore, Panel E includes the ‘Huge’ IPOs with total proceeds of over $1000 million, 
and Panel F includes the ‘Unicorn’ technology IPOs with total proceeds over $1000 million. 
Lastly, Panel A consists of the ‘Full’ sample of IPO of all market capitalisations, and is 
further divided into time classes, on a yearly basis. 
By examining the summary statistics in Table 1, it can be clearly seen that the 
‘Full’ sample is dominated by U.S. IPOs on one hand and small and medium issues of under 
$500 million on the other hand. The median gross spreads of the Full sample are exactly 
seven percent in 7 out of 11 years of the sample period. The median gross spread is also 
seven percent during all years of the Full sample.  In the U.S. subsample, the median gross 
spread is below 7% only in the financial crisis years of 2008 and 2009. Strikingly, the median 
gross spread of all years in the European subsample is 3.75%, almost half of the U.S. 
percentage. However, the median gross spreads in Europe have gradually increased over the 
decade while the U.S. ones have stayed on the seven percent level. This is clear evidence of 
the persistent clustering in the U.S. markets.  
Looking at the IPO size classes in Panels B-E, the gross spreads are strongly 
decreasing as the issue size increases. In the Huge class of IPOs of issue size over $1000 
million dollars, the median gross spread drops to 3.63% in the U.S. and further to only 1.50% 
in Europe (to 2.38% in the combined “huge” sample).  This clearly suggests that the 
underwriters are taking the economies of scale into account while setting the spreads for the 
bigger issues. However, contradicting the expectations, the issues of the Unicorn class do 
not achieve the smallest median gross spreads. In the U.S. subsample, both the average and 
median Unicorn class gross spreads are slightly lower than in the Huge class. In the European 
subsample, the average Unicorn class gross spread is actually six basis point above the Huge 
class gross spread, while the median gross spread is equal to the 1.50% gross spread of the 
Huge class. In the ‘Full’ sample, that includes all the 1450 IPOs, both the average and median 
gross spreads are slightly above the Huge class in the Unicorn class. Therefore, it can be 
deduced that the ‘unicorn’ companies face slightly higher gross spreads than their similarly 
sized, non-technology peer companies. However, it must be noted that the number of unicorn 
companies’ IPOs even in the Full sample is low, only 23 (13 in the U.S. and 10 in the 
European subsample), which must be kept in mind when drawing conclusions. 
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Another matter that can be noticed from Table 1 by looking at the Count 
columns, is the centralising of U.S. IPOs around the lower size classes and adversely, the 
centralising of European IPOs around the higher size classes. Almost 90% of U.S. IPOs 
within the sample fall into the Small and Medium classes, while in the European subsample, 
the IPOs are more evenly spread over the size classes. In both subsamples, the Medium class 
is the largest and the Small class the second largest. Noticeably, the Huge class actually 
contains more European than U.S. issues, while in all other classes, there are more U.S. than 
European issues. Consequently, the amount and strong centralising of U.S. IPOs around the 
two lower size classes causes the results of these classes in the ‘Full’ sample to be heavily 
influenced by the proportion of U.S. IPOs. This can be clearly seen from the average and 
median gross spreads of Small and Medium IPOs in the Full sample, which are very close 
to the levels in the U.S. subsample. This is particularly evident in the median gross spread 
of Small issues in the Full sample, which is exactly 7%, perfectly equal to the U.S. value.
  
 
Table 1. Summary statistics for the full sample of 1450 U.S. and European IPOs from 2008-2018. 
Table 1 presents the full sample of 1450 IPO (the result of filtering process described in section ‘4.2. Data filtering process’), of which 1178 are U.S. and 272 European 
IPOs from the time period of 2008-2018. ‘Count’ refers to the number of IPOs (observations) in each category. ‘Gross spread’ is calculated as a percentage of the total 
amount of proceeds collected in the IPO. The ‘Proceeds’ columns list the total amount of proceeds collected in the IPOs of each category, disclosing the issue size, on million 
U.S. dollars basis. 
  U.S.   Europe   U.S. and Europe 
 Count 
Gross 
spread, 
% 
(Mean) 
Gross 
spread, 
% 
(Median) 
Proceeds, 
$ Million 
(Mean) 
Proceeds, 
$ Million 
(Median)  Count 
Gross 
spread, 
% 
(Mean) 
Gross 
spread, 
% 
(Median) 
Proceeds, 
$ Million 
(Mean) 
Proceeds, 
$ Million 
(Median)  Count 
Gross 
spread, 
% 
(Mean) 
Gross 
spread, 
% 
(Median) 
Proceeds, 
$ Million 
(Mean) 
Proceeds, 
$ Million 
(Median) 
Panel A: All Proceeds 
2008 22 6.31 6.88 1071.6 177.8  15 4.17 4.25 673.9 220.0  37 5.44 6.5 910.4 189.0 
2009 41 6.35 6.50 338.6 156.3  5 4.61 2.50 1013.2 1215.5  46 6.16 6.5 411.9 158.3 
2010 103 6.72 7.00 308.7 103.0  26 3.06 2.50 885.6 638.0  129 5.98 7.0 425.0 145.0 
2011 95 6.46 7.00 286.0 145.6  38 3.69 2.99 1041.3 368.4  133 5.67 6.5 501.8 166.3 
2012 111 6.55 7.00 325.3 113.8  16 4.13 4.00 553.1 190.0  127 6.24 7.0 354.0 120.0 
2013 172 6.64 7.00 258.2 116.1  33 4.11 4.01 370.1 250.6  205 6.24 7.0 276.2 127.5 
2014 202 6.52 7.00 230.6 100.1  49 4.25 4.00 487.6 227.4  251 6.08 7.0 280.8 105.6 
2015 124 6.56 7.00 200.4 100.9  36 4.15 3.25 340.9 195.2  160 6.02 7.0 232.0 116.0 
2016 69 6.56 7.00 156.5 94.5  16 4.14 3.88 486.8 95.1  85 6.11 7.0 218.7 94.5 
2017 109 6.35 7.00 236.6 125.0  19 5.69 6.00 393.3 200.0  128 6.25 7.0 259.9 125.0 
2018 130 6.52 7.00 208.6 107.1  19 4.89 5.46 211.8 129.7  149 6.31 7.0 209.0 108.0 
All years 1178 6.53 7.00 264.9 112.0  272 4.16 3.75 567.2 229.3  1450 6.09 7.0 321.6 121.7 
Panel B: “Small” Proceeds {$25 Million - $100 Million} 
All years 501 6.92 7.00 63.8 65.0  70 5.47 6.75 61.5 58.4  571 6.74 7.00 63.6 65.0 
Panel C: “Medium” Proceeds {$100 Million - $500 Million} 
All years 557 6.56 7.00 204.0 168.0  116 4.81 5.48 237.6 216.0  673 6.26 6.75 209.8 179.2 
Panel D: “Large” Proceeds {$500 Million - $1000 Million} 
All years 87 5.34 5.50 688.4 660.0  44 2.80 2.50 699.6 707.3  131 4.48 5.00 692.2 667.8 
Panel E: “Huge” Proceeds {≥ $1000 Million} 
All years 33 3.41 3.63 3229.7 1820.0  42 1.60 1.50 2181.8 1746.2  75 2.40 2.38 2642.9 1766.6 
Panel F: "Unicorn" Proceeds {≥ $1000 Million} & Technology = 1 
All years 13 3.40 3.30 4378.6 1918.3 
 
10 1.66 1.50 1579.5 1690.5 
 
23 2.64 2.80 3161.6 1760.4 
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The number of IPOs per year is strongly varying throughout the sample period 
of 2008-2018, which can already be seen from Table 1. This yearly fluctuation is further 
illustrated in Figure 2 below as in the years of the financial crisis, 2008 and 2009, the total 
number of IPOs in the sample is below 50. When the crisis eased and liquidity returned to 
the markets, the number of IPOs jumps to over a hundred in the U.S. alone. The number of 
European IPOs again drops in 2011, most likely because of the Euro sovereign debt crisis. 
The total number of IPOs reaches 250 in 2014, before again sharply decreasing below one 
hundred in 2016 and then climbing again in 2017 and 2018. These strong yearly fluctuations 
in the number of IPOs per year demonstrate the cyclicality of the IPO market, which has 
been frequently researched before e.g. by Lowry and Schwert in 2002. This cyclicality has 
clearly not gone anywhere, continuing throughout the sample period. It is commonly called 
‘the opening and closing of the IPO window’ in the financial world.  
Figure 2. Yearly fluctuation of U.S. and European IPOs from 2008 to 2018. 
Figure 2 shows the full sample of 1450 IPOs, of which 1178 are U.S. and 272 European ones, divided on a 
yearly basis over the sample period of 2008-2018. The IPOs are unevenly distributed over the sample period, 
which illustrates the high cyclicality of the IPO markets. 
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6.2. Clustering analysis 
The clustering analysis shows that significant clustering of gross spreads at the seven percent 
level still persists in the U.S. IPO markets. More than half of U.S. IPOs had gross spreads of 
exactly seven percent during the sample period, with the proportion increasing slightly to 
the end of the period. Especially in the ‘Small’ size class, including issues from $25 million 
to $100 million U.S. dollars, the clustering of the gross spreads remains very strong. The 
proportion of 7% gross spreads in Small class mostly varies around the 80% level during the 
sample period, and no distinctive upward or downward trends can be detected. Furthermore, 
contradicting earlier results by Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), some clustering at 
the 7% level appears to be taking place in the gross spreads of European IPOs as well, 
especially in the Small size class. However, these clustering patterns of the European 
subsample can be explained by several outside factors affecting the results.  
In the ‘Full’ sample, the median gross spreads of the U.S. and European IPOs 
were exactly seven percent in seven of the eleven years of the sample period, and 6.5% in 
the remaining three years. This was the result of the sample consisting almost 80% of U.S. 
IPOs. In the European subsample, the median gross spreads were nowhere close to seven 
percent, varying between 3-6% over the years, except in the ‘Small’ class, where the median 
gross spread was 6.75%, when including all years of the sample period. Focusing on the U.S. 
subsample, the gross spreads were gradually very close to 7% throughout the sample period. 
The median gross spreads in the U.S. subsample were 7.00% during all sample period years, 
save for 2008 and 2009, when the median gross spreads were 6.88% and 6.50%, respectively. 
Proportionally, more than half of the U.S. IPOs had gross spreads of exactly seven percent, 
which is shown in Figure 3. The number of U.S. IPOs with gross spreads of exactly seven 
percent varied between ca. 50% to 70% over the decade, increasing slightly to the end of the 
period. Out of the total 1178 U.S. IPOs, 696 (59%) had 7% spreads. Thus, in the whole U.S. 
sample and throughout the whole sample period, the clustering pattern is evident.  
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Figure 3. Yearly proportion of U.S. IPOs with exactly 7% gross spreads in 2008-2018. 
Figure 3 discloses the yearly proportion of IPOs with exactly 7% gross spreads, measured as a percentage of 
the total proceeds collected in the IPO, in the U.S. subsample. Of the 1178 U.S. IPOs in the subsample, 696 
had exactly 7% gross spreads, which illustrates the significant clustering of U.S. IPO fees on the 7% level. This 
clustering is present throughout the whole sample period of 2008-2018.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the U.S. IPO size range of $25 million to $100 million, in which clustering 
of the gross spreads had been found to be most severe before by Chen and Ritter (2000) and 
Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), clustering still remains very strong. This is 
illustrated in Figure 4, which shows the percentage of U.S. IPOs with exactly 7% gross 
spreads in the size range from $25 to $100 million in total proceeds of the IPO. As discovered 
by Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), the proportion of 7% spreads in this size range 
increased throughout their sample period of 1998-2007, reaching over 95% in 2007. 
Continuing from their sample period, I found that in 2008 and 2009 every U.S. IPO with 
total proceeds from $25 to $100 million had a 7.00% gross spread. Even though this 
coincides with the financial crisis period, and low overall number of IPOs, this result is 
striking. Later on, the proportion of 7% gross spreads in the $25 to $100 million ‘Small’ 
class varies around the 80% level in the years 2010-2018 of my sample period. No distinctive 
upward or downward trends can be seen in this proportion during the sample period. 
However, it is clear that “the seven percent solution” originally publicised by Chen and Ritter 
(2000) still persists in 2008-2018.  
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Figure 4. The persistence of the “7% solution” in U.S. IPOs with total proceeds of $25 
million - $100 million from 2008 to 2018. 
Figure 4 presents the yearly proportion of IPOs with exactly 7% gross spreads, measured as a percentage of 
the total proceeds collected in the IPO, in the ‘Small’ class of the U.S. subsample. 521 of the total 1178 U.S. 
IPOs fall in the proceeds class of $25 million - $100 million. Of these, 428 (82%) had exactly 7% gross spreads.  
The yearly proportion of 7% gross spreads varies around 80% level with the exceptions of 2008 and 2009, 
when every U.S. IPO in the $25 million - $100 million category had a gross spread of 7%. 
 
The clustering of gross spreads on the 7% level is shown in more detail in 
Figure 5, where the gross spread (as a percentage of the total proceeds in the IPO) is plotted 
on vertical axis, with the total amount of proceeds in the IPO on the horizontal axis. Both 
the ‘Full’ sample (Panel A) and the U.S. subsample (Panel B) show significant clustering at 
the seven percent level. However, this clustering is more severe in the U.S. subsample, and 
compared with the Full sample, the dispersion of gross spreads is greater in the Full sample 
than in the U.S. subsample. The dispersion in the Full sample is caused by the inclusion of 
the European IPOs, whose gross spreads are more evenly dispersed over the percentage-
based scale. The clustering in the Full sample results from the four to one ratio of U.S. versus 
European IPOs, which again heavily affects the results.  
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Figure 5. Clustering of U.S. and European IPO gross spreads in 2008-2018. 
Figure 5 shows the clustering of U.S. and European gross spreads in 2008-2018. Panel A contains the full 
sample of 1450 IPOs, while Panel B consists of 1178 U.S. and Panel C of 272 European IPOs. The ‘Gross 
spread’ is measured as a percentage of the total IPO proceeds, and the ‘Ln(Proceeds)’ presents the total 
proceeds collected in the IPO in millions of U.S. dollars on a logarithmic scale. 
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Interestingly, unlike before, even the European subsample in Figure 5 (Panel 
C) shows some clustering at the seven percent level. The earlier results of Abrahamson, 
Jenkinson and Jones (2011) showed some clustering of the gross spreads of European IPOs 
at certain integer levels, most significantly at three and four percent levels, but not very much 
at the seven percent level. Even though the density of the clustering found in my European 
sample is nowhere close to the corresponding density in the U.S. sample, it is still a 
surprising finding, since no studies before have indicated any clustering at the 7% level in 
European IPO gross spreads. If the clustering of European gross spreads found in my data 
could not be explained with any sampling or other issues, it would be an important discovery.  
To better study the potential clustering of European gross spreads at the seven 
percent level detected in my sample, similar analysis to the one used with the clustering 
found in the U.S. subsample is conducted. Figure 6 shows the yearly proportion of IPOs in 
the European subsample with exactly 7% gross spreads. In the figure, the yearly proportion 
of 7% gross spreads varies greatly over the years, from 0 to round 40 percent. In 2009, the 
proportion was zero, albeit the total number of European IPOs in 2009 was only 5 in the 
sample, and in 2017, the proportion was 42%. However, it is undisputable that some 
clustering of European gross spreads at the 7% level appears to be taking place in my data 
during 2008-2018.  
Figure 6. Yearly proportion of European IPOs with 7% gross spreads in 2008-2018. 
Figure 6 discloses the yearly proportion of IPOs with exactly 7% gross spreads, measured as a percentage of 
the total proceeds collected in the IPO, in the European subsample. Of the 272 European IPOs in the subsample, 
60 had exactly 7% gross spreads. In 2009, no European IPOs had 7% gross spreads, while the total number of 
European IPOs in 2009 included in the sample was only 5. 
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Out of the size classes of the European subsample, the median gross spread is 
closest to seven percent in the IPOs of the ‘Small’ class of $25-100 million U.S. dollars in 
total proceeds collected. Again, this is the same range in which the greatest clustering was 
found, both in previous studies (by Chen and Ritter (2000) and by Abrahamson, Jenkinson 
and Jones (2011)) and in my sample. To investigate further, the yearly proportions of 7% 
gross spreads in European issues in the Small class is shown in Figure 7. The results greatly 
vary; in 2008 and 2010, the proportion of 7% gross spreads is zero, while in 2015 and 2017, 
it is 67% of the years’ issues. Thus, in the Small class, significant clustering at the 7% level 
is taking place in the European subsample.  
Figure 7. Yearly proportion of European IPOs with 7% gross spreads with total 
proceeds of $25 million - $100 million from 2008 to 2018. 
Figure 7 presents the yearly proportion of IPOs with exactly 7% gross spreads, measured as a percentage of 
the total proceeds collected in the IPO, in the ‘Small’ class of the European subsample. 70 of the total 272 
European IPOs fall in the proceeds class of $25 million - $100 million. Of these, 32 (46%) had exactly 7% 
gross spreads.  The yearly proportion of 7% gross spreads greatly varies over the years, from 0% to 67%. In 
2009, no European IPOs in the $25 million - $100 million category were included in my data.  
 
However, the clustering patterns found in the European subsample, especially 
in the ‘Small’ size class, can be explained by several factors that I was able to find behind 
this interesting result. First, clustering at other integer-based levels can also be found to be 
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almost all 7% gross spread cases of the European small class, are in fact U.S. exchanges, 
unlike the primary exchanges (and the domicile nations) that are European.  Thus, it can be 
deduced that these 7% gross spread IPOs in the Small class of the European subsample are 
actually European companies seeking secondary listing in the U.S., and thus are facing U.S. 
level of fees, which happens to cluster around the 7% level in their size class. In a sense, this 
makes them ‘U.S.’ IPOs instead of ‘European’ ones, but not in the classification based on 
the ‘domicile nation’ or ‘primary exchange’ variables in the raw data obtained from the 
Securities and Data Company (SDC) Platinum database.   
Third, during the data filtering process that was used to form the final ‘Full’ 
sample, 984 European IPOs were sorted out due to missing gross spread data, almost 
exclusively from the ‘Small’ and ‘Medium’ size classes. As gross spread information is 
required to be presented in the prospectuses of U.S. IPOs by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), it is readily available for U.S. issues. However, the same 
requirement does not exist in Europe, a problem that was already encountered by 
Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones in 2011. Thus, many ‘genuine’ European IPOs were 
sorted out in the data filtering process, but the secondary listings, as described above, 
remained in the European subsample. This links to the fourth factor: as noted earlier, the 
IPOs of the European subsample are more evenly spread over the size classes, unlike in the 
U.S. subsample, where almost 90% of the IPOs are included in the two lowest size classes 
(as seen in Table 1). As many of the smaller European IPOs were sorted out during the data 
filtering process, the proportion of the secondary U.S. listings of European companies facing 
the higher ‘U.S. fees’ greatly increased in the two lower size classes of the European 
subsample, especially in the Small class.
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6.3. Regression analysis 
The regression analysis confirms the expectations that the ‘size effect’ of decreasing gross 
spreads with increasing issue size can be observed during the sample period from 2008 to 
2018. The ‘technology effect’ of technology companies facing slightly higher gross spreads 
than their similarly sized peers, as noted by Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), is 
also observable in the sample. In privatisations carried out via IPOs, the gross spreads are 
lower than in otherwise similar IPOs. Book-builder syndicates result in higher fees than in 
IPOs with a single underwriter. Companies controlled by founder managers are not found to 
be accomplishing public listings with lower fees relative to their peers. To some extent, the 
regression results for unicorn companies seem to be misleading, but in the end not conflicting 
to earlier results of the figurative analysis. The regressions results are also consistent over 
years, and in the European subsample, over different national IPO markets. 
The regression results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are 
presented in Table 2. Again, to make a comparison, the ‘Full’ sample was divided to U.S. 
and European subsamples, and further according to the issue size, measured by total amount 
of proceeds collected in the IPOs, the size classes being similar as before, as in Table 1. The 
gross spread, measured as a percentage of the total amount of proceeds collected in the IPO, 
was used as the dependent variable. The independent variables were the total amount of 
proceeds collected in the IPOs in logarithmic form (‘lnProceeds’) and dummy variables for 
high-tech offerings (‘Technology’), privatisations (‘Privatisation’) and book-builder 
syndicates (‘Syndicate’). In addition, for the IPOs of companies under the control of founder-
managers, the ‘F-M’ dummy was used, and for technology-based ‘founder-manager’ 
companies, the dummy ‘F-M-T’ was used. A dummy variable for ‘unicorn’ companies 
(‘Unicorn’) was also established. Moreover, year dummies for the years in the sample period 
of 2008-2018 and country dummies for the most prominent European markets (‘U.K.’, 
‘Germany’, ‘Netherlands’, ‘Russia’ and ‘France’) were also included. The significance of 
the results was evaluated by calculating the robust t-statistics of the coefficients. 
 As expected, the results confirm that the size effect of gross spreads decreasing 
as the issue size increases is still present during my sample period of 2008-2018. The 
coefficients of the proceeds variable (‘lnProceeds’) were negative throughout the results 
obtained by regressions with different samples, with only one conflicting result, as the 
European Unicorn size class had a positive proceeds coefficient. This was most likely an 
outlier due to low number of observations, only 10. The coefficients were also highly 
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statistically significant when all size classes are included (the ‘All Proceeds’ column), in the 
U.S., European and ‘Full’ sample. These results support the theory on how the economies 
of scale harnessed by the underwriters are also reflected in pricing as the IPO size increases. 
It is also, not surprisingly, very well in line with the earlier results of studies by Chen and 
Ritter (2000) and Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011).  
In the case of technology companies (‘Technology’), according to the results, 
it seems that the ‘tables have not turned around’, and technology companies going public 
still pay slightly higher gross spreads than their otherwise similar peers. For the technology 
companies, the coefficients for the Technology dummy were all slightly positive, except in 
the ‘Large’ $500-1000 million issue size class, where they were negative in both U.S. and 
European subsamples and the ‘Full’ sample. These results were also in line with 
Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), who found a similar positive ‘technology effect’ 
on the gross spreads, but contradictory to the hypothesis setting. Overall, the coefficients 
indeed are largely slightly positive, and statistically significant when all size classes are 
included, in all three ‘main samples’ (i.e. the U.S. and the European subsamples, and the 
combined Full sample). Highly statistically significant, (slightly) positive results can also be 
found in the ‘Small’ ($25-100 million) and ‘Medium’ ($100-500 million) size classes of the 
combined U.S. and European sample, and in the European Small class. The negative values 
found in the Large class lacked statistical significance. 
 In the ‘privatisation’ IPOs (‘Privatisation’), where there is a public party (e.g. 
a government) selling its equity in order to privatise a business, the gross spreads charged 
by the underwriters are lower than in otherwise similar IPOs. The result is consistent with 
Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), who also found the privatisations to experience 
lower gross spreads, though the explanatory power is weaker. Abrahamson, Jenkinson and 
Jones (2011) offer no explanation for the phenomenon, but it could be theorised that the 
government is a strong counterparty in negotiations with the underwriters, resulting in lower 
gross spreads. This theory is supported by Torstila (2001), who suggests that the 
underwriters value the follow-up possibilities included in a privatisation when negotiating 
about their fees. One good example of this is the IPOs of the Turk Telekomunikasyon AS, 
where the Turkish government privatised the company through two IPOs and paid only a 
tiny 0.09% gross spread to the underwriters (as seen in the Appendix 4), a number 
significantly lower than even in the other ‘Huge’ class IPOs. The privatisation results are 
only relevant for European issues, since no U.S. privatisations took place in 2008-2018. 
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According to the regression results, using multiple book-builders results in 
higher fees. Throughout the sample, the coefficients for book-builder syndicates 
(‘Syndicate’) are slightly positive, with only exceptions found in the Huge class of European 
subsample and the ‘Full’ sample, albeit with no explanatory power. Including all size classes, 
the coefficients for syndicates are slightly positive in all main samples. This is somewhat 
contradictory to earlier results by Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), who found the 
underwriter syndicates to have very slightly positive, or more importantly, strongly negative 
effect on the gross spreads. Especially for the European sample, their results were negative 
with high explanatory power. Thus, it seems that even though underwriter syndicates used 
to result in lower fees in Europe, this does not hold during my sample period of 2008-2018.  
For the companies with powerful founder-managers retaining the control 
through voting rights, the results are not supportive of the hypothesis. In the U.S. subsample, 
in ‘Small’, ‘Huge’ and ‘Unicorn’ classes, very slightly negative coefficients of the founder-
manager dummies (‘F-M’ and ‘F-M-T’)  can be found, but in ‘Medium’, ‘Large’ and ‘All 
proceeds’ classes, they are very slightly positive or not available. Statistically, there is no 
explanatory power. In the European subsample, coefficients are in most cases not available, 
or lack explanatory power. However, the negative coefficient of the F-M dummy in the 
European ‘Unicorn’ class stands out with very high statistical significance, but this is 
explained by very low number of observations and inclusion of two outliers, the IPOs of 
MegaFon (see Appendix 3). In the ‘Full’ sample, the founder-manager dummies have very 
slightly positive or negative coefficients with no or weak explanatory power, depending on 
the size class. To conclude, it seems that the results do not support the idea that founder-
managers with controlling rights could be able to exercise their negotiation power towards 
underwriters, resulting in lower gross spreads. The results do not change, whether the 
company controlled by the founder-manager(s) is a technology company or not.  
As for unicorn companies, the regression results are somewhat misleading. To 
better examine the gross spreads faced by the unicorn companies, the ‘Unicorn’ dummy 
variable was introduced to the main sample level. It receives positive and statistically highly 
significant results in all three main samples, indicating that the unicorn companies would 
pay lower fees to the underwriters. However, this is only half true. Looking back at Table 1, 
the unicorn companies are indeed paying low fees, but not lower than their control group, 
the ‘Huge’ class, who are paying slightly lower fees than the ‘Unicorns’. What separates the 
Unicorns from the Huge class, is the fact that all unicorn companies are also technology 
companies, something that all companies of the Huge class are not. Thus, it can be reasoned 
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that the unicorn companies indeed pay lower fees due to their strong exposure to the size 
effect, but simultaneously, also slightly higher fees than their similarly sized peers due to 
their exposure to the technology effect 
 The year and country dummies are acting properly as time and market controls. 
First, the year dummies seem to have some explanatory power at the main sample level in 
the European and ‘Full’ samples, but any consistent patterns disappear when the samples are 
divided into size classes. In the U.S. subsample, no explanatory power can be found. The 
yearly results in ‘Small’ and ‘Medium’ classes of the European subsample, and thus, the 
results of the Full sample affected by the European results, are again caused by low number 
of observations, including some outliers. Looking at the ‘All proceeds’ column of the Full 
sample, the coefficients of year dummies are negative with similar magnitude. Since the 
purpose of the year dummies is to act as time controls, being negative on similar levels over 
the years, they confirm that the other control variables are consistent over time. However, 
the year dummy coefficients suggest a mild increase in the European gross spreads over the 
sample period of 2008-2018, which is in line with earlier results shown in Table 1.  
Second, the country dummies initially also seem to have explanatory power 
over the gross spread, when observing the significance of the country coefficient values in 
the ‘Full’ sample. However, this significance disappears in the European subsample, when 
the U.S. observations are excluded. This is especially true for the British (‘U.K.’) and 
German (‘Germany’) markets, even though the dummy values suggest lower fees for both 
countries. As the country dummies naturally do not exist in the U.S. sample, it can be 
deduced that they do not have real explanatory power either in the Full sample. Thus, the 
European results are not biased by IPOs of any single market. 
The constants (‘Constant’), i.e. the intercepts of the regressions, could be 
interpreted as the ‘average’ level of gross spreads in the sample, but this proves to be 
somewhat misleading. It is often difficult to interpret the constant, and the same stands for 
my results; the constants are higher than the average fees presented in Table 1. However, 
this is explained by the distribution of the data. The gross spreads are decreasing as the issue 
size (‘lnProceeds’) increases. Thus, the ‘size effect’ causes the regression trendline, if drawn 
over the data, to be downward sloping. This is demonstrated in Figure 8, which includes all 
observations of the ‘Full’ sample. It also means that the constant will be inevitably higher 
than the calculated average level of fees.  Thus, the interpretation of the constants as the 
‘average’ level of fees is somewhat incorrect. Possibly for the same reason, Abrahamson, 
Jenkinson and Jones (2011) present no interpretation of the constants. 
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Figure 8. Regression trendline in the Full sample.  
Figure 8 shows the clustering of IPO gross spreads, containing the full sample of 1450 IPOs. ‘Gross spread’ is 
a percentage of the total IPO proceeds, and ‘ln(Proceeds)’ is the total IPO proceeds (in $ million) on a 
logarithmic scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The adjusted8 r-squared (‘R2’) values, i.e. the overall fits of the regressions, do 
not reveal anything particularly interesting. Generally, the r-squared values are not directly 
comparable between different regression models. A r-squared of 5% could be high in some 
applications (e.g. in regression models predicting returns), but low in others (e.g. regression 
models used for factor-based asset pricing). In my sample, the r-squared values of the 
regressions vary between 2% in the U.S. Small class to 86% in the U.S. Unicorn class, with 
the values becoming heavily inflated as the number of observations in the class decreases. 
Similar variation also appears in the r-squared values of the earlier regression results by 
Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011). As with the constants, Abrahamson, Jenkinson 
and Jones (2011) do not comment on the r-squared values of their regression results.
 
8 According to the example of Theil (1961), the adjusted r-squared (?̅?2) values of my regressions are calculated 
as follows, with a penalty for the number of regressors as the R2 always increases if more independent variables 
are added to the regression model: 
 
?̅?2 = 1 − [
𝑛 − 1
𝑛 − 𝑘 − 1
(1 − 𝑅2)] 
 
 
in which ‘n’ = number of observations in the (sub)sample, ‘k’ = number of independent variables, excluding 
the constant and ‘R2’ = non-adjusted r-squared = 1 – Sum of squared residuals / Sum of squares.  
  
 
Table 2. Determinants of gross spreads in U.S. and European IPOs from 2008 to 2018. 
Table 2 presents the determinants of gross spreads obtained by running OLS regressions on the sample data of 1450 IPOs (the result of filtering process described in Section 
4 “4.2. Data filtering process”), from the period of 2008-2018, categorised based on the IPO size. The dependent variable is gross spread (as a percentage multiplier of the 
total amount of proceeds collected in the IPO). The independent variables are the natural logarithm of proceeds (total amount of proceeds collected in the IPOs), plus dummy 
variables for technology offerings, privatisations, book-builder syndicates, offerings of companies controlled by founder-managers, offerings of technology companies 
controlled by founder-managers and offerings of ‘unicorn’ companies. Year dummies for the years 2008-2018 and country dummies for the most important European 
markets (U.K., Germany, Netherlands, Russia and France) are also included. Significance is based on Student’s (1908) t-statistics (*** = 0.1% ; ** = 1% ; * = 5%). 
        U.S.       
    
≥$25 Million 
>$100 Million 
≥$100 Million 
>$500 Million 
≥$500 Million 
>$1000 Million >$1000 Million 
Unicorns >$1000 
Million All Proceeds 
 Constant   0.074 ***  0.103 ***  0.135 ***  0.103 ***  0.146   0.096 *** 
Control Variables lnProceeds - 0.001  - 0.007 *** - 0.011 * - 0.009 ** - 0.010  - 0.007 *** 
 Technology  0.001   0.003 *** - 0.006 *  0.007   -   0.002 ** 
 Privatisation -   -   -   -   -   -  
 Syndicate  0.001   0.001   0.004   -   -   0.004 *** 
 F-M - 0.001   0.003   0.000  - 0.010  - 0.018   0.002  
 F-M-T - 0.005   0.000   0.007   -   -   0.000  
  Unicorn   -     -     -     -     -   - 0.014 *** 
Year Dummies 2009  0.000  - 0.002  - 0.007  - 0.006  - 0.029  - 0.001  
 2010  0.000   0.000  - 0.009  - 0.012   -  - 0.001  
 2011 - 0.003  - 0.001  - 0.008  - 0.005  - 0.025  - 0.002  
 2012  0.000  - 0.003  - 0.009  - 0.001  - 0.018  - 0.002  
 2013  0.002  - 0.001  - 0.006  - 0.004  - 0.033  - 0.001  
 2014 - 0.001  - 0.003  - 0.010  - 0.008  - 0.027  - 0.003  
 2015 - 0.002  - 0.003  - 0.006   0.002  - 0.015  - 0.003  
 2016 - 0.003  - 0.003  - 0.009   0.004   -  - 0.004  
 2017  0.000  - 0.004  - 0.019 * - 0.004  - 0.019  - 0.004  
  2018 - 0.004   - 0.002   - 0.010   - 0.006   - 0.027   - 0.003   
Country Dummies U.K.  -   -   -   -   -   -  
 Germany  -   -   -   -   -   -  
 Netherlands -   -   -   -   -   -  
 Russia  -   -   -   -   -   -  
  France   -     -     -     -     -     -   
Adjusted R2   0.017   0.201   0.137   0.420   0.861   0.366  
Observations   501   557   87   33   12   1178  
 
  
 
 
Table 2. Determinants of gross spreads in U.S. and European IPOs from 2008 to 2018. (CONTINUED) 
Table 2 presents the determinants of gross spreads obtained by running OLS regressions on the sample data of 1450 IPOs (the result of filtering process described in Section 
4 “4.1. Data filtering process”), from the period of 2008-2018, categorised based on the IPO size. The dependent variable is gross spread (as a percentage multiplier of the 
total amount of proceeds collected in the IPO). The independent variables are the natural logarithm of proceeds (total amount of proceeds collected in the IPOs), plus dummy 
variables for technology offerings, privatisations, book-builder syndicates, offerings of companies controlled by founder-managers, offerings of technology companies 
controlled by founder-managers and offerings of ‘unicorn’ companies. Year dummies for the years 2008-2018 and country dummies for the most important European 
markets (U.K., Germany, Netherlands, Russia and France) are also included. Significance is based on Student’s (1908) t-statistics (*** = 0.1% ; ** = 1% ; * = 5%). 
    Europe 
    
≥$25 Million 
>$100 Million 
≥$100 Million 
>$500 Million 
≥$500 Million 
>$1000 Million >$1000 Million 
Unicorns >$1000 
Million All Proceeds 
 Constant  0.075 ***  0.142 ***  0.342 **  0.050  - 0.142 ***  0.103 *** 
Control Variables lnProceeds - 0.004  - 0.015 ** - 0.046 * - 0.005   0.024 *** - 0.010 *** 
 Technology  0.019 ***  0.010 * - 0.011   0.004   -   0.014 *** 
 Privatisation -  - 0.044 * - 0.020  - 0.010  - 0.035 *** - 0.020 *** 
 Syndicate  0.016 ***  0.008  - 0.020   0.004   -   0.015 *** 
 F-M  -   -   -   0.020  - 0.016 ***  0.008  
 F-M-T  -   -   -   -   -   -  
  Unicorn   -     -     -     -     -   - 0.018 * 
Year Dummies 2009  -   0.004   -   0.005   -  - 0.005  
 2010 - 0.043 ** - 0.022 *  0.017   0.000  - 0.019 *** - 0.018 ** 
 2011 - 0.021 * - 0.016  - 0.010   0.006   0.039 *** - 0.018 ** 
 2012 - 0.028 * - 0.009   -  - 0.015  - 0.007 *** - 0.017 * 
 2013 - 0.020 * - 0.019  - 0.002  - 0.001   -  - 0.018 ** 
 2014 - 0.029 ** - 0.019   0.010  - 0.005  - 0.019 *** - 0.020 *** 
 2015 - 0.027 * - 0.027 **  0.006  - 0.012   -  - 0.022 *** 
 2016 - 0.032 ** - 0.036 **  0.010 * - 0.014   -  - 0.026 *** 
 2017 - 0.014  - 0.014   0.020   0.016   -  - 0.011 . 
  2018 - 0.035 ** - 0.018     0.046     -     -   - 0.019 ** 
Country Dummies U.K. - 0.003  - 0.006   0.002   0.013   -  - 0.004  
 Germany - 0.000  - 0.005   0.003   0.012   -  - 0.005  
 Netherlands 0.009   0.000   0.027   0.009   -   0.003  
 Russia  -   0.002   0.006  - 0.008   -  - 0.006  
  France - 0.002     0.013     -     0.002     -     0.001   
Adjusted R2   0.654   0.263   0.393   0.264   n.m.   0.511  
Observations     70     116     44     42     10     272   
  
 
Table 2. Determinants of gross spreads in U.S. and European IPOs from 2008 to 2018. (CONTINUED) 
Table 2 presents the determinants of gross spreads obtained by running OLS regressions on the sample data of 1450 IPOs (the result of filtering process described in Section 
4 “4.2. Data filtering process”), from the period of 2008-2018, categorised based on the IPO size. The dependent variable is gross spread (as a percentage multiplier of the 
total amount of proceeds collected in the IPO). The independent variables are the natural logarithm of proceeds (total amount of proceeds collected in the IPOs), plus dummy 
variables for technology offerings, privatisations, book-builder syndicates, offerings of companies controlled by founder-managers, offerings of technology companies 
controlled by founder-managers and offerings of ‘unicorn’ companies. Year dummies for the years 2008-2018 and country dummies for the most important European 
markets (U.K., Germany, Netherlands, Russia and France) are also included. Significance is based on Student’s (1908) t-statistics (*** = 0.1% ; ** = 1% ; * = 5%). 
        U.S. and Europe       
    
≥$25 Million 
>$100 Million 
≥$100 Million 
>$500 Million 
≥$500 Million 
>$1000 Million 
>$1000 
Million 
Unicorns     
>$1000 Million All Proceeds 
 Constant  0.074 ***  0.113 ***  0.115 *  0.076 ***  0.047   0.103 *** 
Control Variables lnProceeds - 0.002  - 0.010 *** - 0.010  - 0.008 ** - 0.002  - 0.009 *** 
 Technology  0.004 ***  0.004 *** - 0.003   0.005   -   0.004 *** 
 Privatisation -  - 0.052 *** - 0.034 *** - 0.018 ** - 0.033 * - 0.034 *** 
 Syndicate  0.006 ***  0.008 *** - 0.003   0.015 *  -   0.009 *** 
 F-M  0.001   0.005   0.004  - 0.001  - 0.002   0.005 * 
 F-M-T - 0.008  - 0.001   0.003   -   -  - 0.002  
  Unicorn   -     -     -     -     -   - 0.011 *** 
Year Dummies 2009  0.000  - 0.005   0.008  - 0.000   0.006  - 0.002  
 2010 - 0.001  - 0.006   0.002  - 0.013  - 0.019  - 0.005 * 
 2011 - 0.004  - 0.006 * - 0.001  - 0.007   0.008  - 0.008 *** 
 2012 - 0.002  - 0.006 *  0.009  - 0.007  - 0.018  - 0.006 * 
 2013  0.001  - 0.007 *  0.005  - 0.004   0.001  - 0.006 * 
 2014 - 0.002  - 0.009 **  0.005  - 0.003  - 0.004  - 0.008 *** 
 2015 - 0.002  - 0.011 ***  0.005   0.002  - 0.005  - 0.008 *** 
 2016 - 0.005  - 0.010 **  0.003   0.005   -  - 0.010 *** 
 2017  0.001  - 0.009 ** - 0.003  - 0.005  - 0.002  - 0.007 ** 
  2018 - 0.006   - 0.007 *   0.011   - 0.000     0.010   - 0.007 ** 
Country Dummies U.K. - 0.020 *** - 0.017 *** - 0.012 * - 0.010   -  - 0.017 *** 
 Germany - 0.014 *** - 0.018 *** - 0.019 ** - 0.019 **  -  - 0.018 *** 
 Netherlands 0.000  - 0.007   0.012  - 0.010   -  - 0.006 * 
 Russia  -  - 0.003  - 0.022 ** - 0.010   -  - 0.019 *** 
  France - 0.008     0.005     -   - 0.014     -   - 0.006   
Adjusted R2   0.246   0.331   0.298   0.414   0.593   0.526  
Observations     571     673     131     75     23     1450   
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7. DISCUSSION 
To begin with, the hypotheses set in Section 3 can now be evaluated against the results of 
the analysis described in Section 6. Table 3 below draws a comparison between the 
hypotheses and the results. Assessing the success and accuracy of the hypothesis setting, the 
outcome is mixed. In the cases of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, the findings support the 
hypotheses. As for Hypothesis 3, the evidence points to the opposite direction. Lastly, for 
Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5, the results are somewhat conflicting, depending e.g. on the 
size classification of the IPOs. Thus, it can be concluded that the accuracy of the hypothesis 
setting was only moderate. 
Table 3. Hypotheses and Findings. 
Table 1 presents the hypotheses 1-5 set in Section 3 (‘Hypotheses’) and the corresponding results found relative 
to these hypotheses (‘Findings’). 
Hypotheses Findings 
H1: U.S. IPOs will have higher gross 
spreads (will be more expensive) than 
European ones 
The U.S. IPOs are greatly costlier than 
European ones from the issuers’ 
perspective 
H2: IPOs with larger market capitalisations 
will have smaller gross spreads 
Underwriters require smaller gross spreads 
for IPOs with larger market capitalisations 
H3: Technology IPOs will have smaller 
gross spreads than otherwise similar IPOs 
Technology companies face slightly higher 
gross spreads than their non-tech peers 
H4: IPOs of companies controlled by 
founder-managers will have smaller gross 
spreads than otherwise similar IPOs 
The ‘founder-manager’-flagged IPOs 
cannot be associated with lower gross 
spreads than their control group 
H5: IPOs of “Unicorn” companies will 
have the smallest gross spreads 
The ‘Unicorns’ face slightly higher gross 
spreads than their similarly sized peers 
 
The U.S. and European median gross spreads (presented in Table 1) clearly 
show that the U.S. gross spreads for similar issues are way above the European ones. 
Controlling for size, the U.S. spreads are higher in every class, with the difference increasing 
as the issue size increases. Controlling for time, U.S. spreads are again significantly higher 
every year during the sample period. Thus, hypothesis one is supported by the results, 
proving that U.S. IPOs have higher gross spreads than European ones, making them more 
expensive from the companies’ perspective.  Moreover, in the case of hypothesis two, based 
on the pattern that the median IPO gross spreads decrease as the issue size increases (which 
can be clearly observed from Table 1), and the regression coefficients of the total amount of 
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proceeds in logarithmic form (the coefficient of variable ‘lnProceeds’ as seen in Table 2), it 
can be stated that IPOs with larger market capitalisations indeed experience smaller gross 
spreads. Thus, hypothesis two is also supported by the results. 
For the next three hypotheses, the results are less obvious. According to the 
results of regression analysis, technology companies face slightly higher fees than their 
peers, except in the $500 million to $1000 million U.S. dollars (‘Large’) category, where 
results point to the opposite direction. The results are more in line with Abrahamson, 
Jenkinson and Jones (2011), who also found a slightly positive effect, on the contrary to 
what was expected in the hypothesis setting. The evidence speaks against hypothesis three 
as technology IPOs do not have smaller gross spreads than otherwise similar IPOs, and they 
actually have slightly higher gross spreads. This can be clearly seen from the highly 
statistically significant positive coefficients of the U.S. and European subsamples and the 
combined ‘Full’ sample (the ‘All proceeds’ columns in Table 2). Thus, hypothesis three is 
not supported by the evidence.  
The findings compared with hypothesis three are somewhat ambiguous. First, 
looking at the coefficients of the ‘F-M’ dummy, the companies with founder-managers 
retaining the effective control seem to experience slightly lower or higher fees, depending 
on the issue size, and the results lack statistical significance. Second, looking at the 
coefficients of the ‘F-M-T’ dummy, the negotiation power of founder-managers appears to 
very slightly mitigate the positive ‘technology effect’ driving up the fees, but these results 
also lack statistical significance. Considering the coefficients of both dummy variables, it 
cannot be confirmed that controlling founder-managers have a lowering effect on the gross 
spreads charged from their companies by the underwriters. Thus, hypothesis four is 
ultimately not supported by the results.  
Lastly, in the case of hypothesis five, the results are again mixed. In the U.S. 
subsample, the unicorn companies seeking public listing face slightly lower fees relative to 
their closest control group, the companies of the ‘Huge’ class. In the European subsample, 
this relation turns around, and the unicorn companies end up paying slightly higher (on 
average level) or equal (on median level) fees relative to the companies of the ‘Huge’ class. 
However, in the ‘Full’ sample, the relation resembles the European subsample, and the 
unicorn companies are charged slightly higher fees, on both average and median terms, by 
the underwriters compared with the ‘Huge’-classed companies. Furthermore, the negative 
statistically significant) coefficients of the ‘Unicorn’ dummy variable found in Table 2 
suggest that the unicorn companies are paying lower fees relative to their peers. However, 
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by using the ‘Huge’ class as a size control, it can be deduced that the negative coefficients 
result from the unicorn companies’ exposure to the ‘size effect’, and that their exposure to 
the technology effect in turn works against this negative relation. This is also well in line 
with the results of the technology companies, and by combining the size and technology 
effects, the result is slightly higher median and average fees than in the ‘Huge’ class. Thus, 
hypothesis five is also ultimately not supported by the results. 
The clustering patterns found in earlier studies by Chen and Ritter (2000), and 
Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011) are still present during my sample period, and 
significant clustering of gross spreads at the seven percent level persists in the U.S. 
subsample. Over half of U.S. IPOs had exactly 7% gross spreads in 2008-2018, and the 
proportion of 7% gross spreads increased slightly in the course of the period. Especially the 
gross spreads of the issues in the $25 to $100 million ‘Small’ class were strongly clustered, 
with the proportion of 7% gross spreads mostly varying around 80% level in this size class 
during the sample period. However, no distinctive upward or downward trends were 
detectable. Additionally, I found that some clustering at the 7% level appeared to be 
occurring in the gross spreads of issues included in the European subsample. This surprising 
finding concerned particularly the Small size class of the European subsample and conflicted 
with the results of the 2011 study by Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones. However, this 
clustering found in the European subsample could be explained by several factors that were 
affecting the results, for example by the secondary listings of European companies on U.S. 
exchanges. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
I analysed the gross spreads of U.S. and European initial public offerings during the sample 
period of 2008 to 2018. Through data selection and filtering, a raw sample of 4515 IPOs was 
condensed into a final sample of 1450 IPOs. Most of the observations were from the U.S., 
nearly 80%, which significantly affects my results. The combined U.S. and European sample 
was divided into U.S. and European subsamples to mitigate this bias. These three main 
samples were then further classified based on the amount of proceeds in the issues, resulting 
in four main classes plus an additional ‘unicorn’ class of huge offerings by technology 
companies. After the subsampling and classification, the data was analysed figuratively, 
visually and with regression analysis, producing time and country-consistent results. Finally, 
the obtained results were reviewed respect to the hypotheses set earlier on, that were based 
on existing literature over the subject. 
By looking at the results of my analysis of the gross spreads in U.S. and 
European IPOs in 2008-2018, it can be concluded that the “seven percent solution” still 
persists to this day. Originally found by Chen and Ritter (2000) and confirmed by 
Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), it concerns the phenomenon of U.S. gross spreads 
clustering around the 7.00% level. It is present in the U.S. issues, especially in the ‘Small’ 
$25 million to $100 million of total proceeds class, but in other size classes as well. Even 
though not as extremely frequent as before, the proportion of exactly 7% gross spreads 
remains very high, on average over 80% in 2008-2018 in the Small issues. The European 
IPO fees also remain mostly much cheaper than the U.S. fees during my sample period of 
2008-2018, even after controlling for issue size and time. However, a specific “three percent 
wedge”, as documented by Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), no longer exists 
between the U.S. and European issues.  
 Based on the regression results, I conclude that technology companies face 
slightly higher gross spreads than their otherwise similar non-technology-based peers, which 
corresponds to the earlier result of Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011). This effect is 
also present with the so-called ‘unicorns’, technology companies with valuations over $1000 
million, who pay lower fees to the underwriters due to their huge size, but eventually slightly 
higher than their peers due to their exposure to the ‘technology effect’. Even the founder-
managers of technology companies retaining the control over the companies seem not be 
able to avoid paying this ‘technology premium’. Generally, the founder-managers do not 
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achieve the same success they had with previous investors in the negotiations with the 
underwriters of the IPOs over the level of the gross spread. 
Moreover, I determine that in privatisations, the gross spreads demanded by 
the underwriters are lower when compared with otherwise similar issues, which is consistent 
with the results of Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011). However, my results are not 
as statistically significant. Also, justified by my results, using multiple book-builders 
(underwriters) mostly results in higher gross spreads. The coefficients for book-builder 
syndicates are slightly positive in all main samples, contradicting earlier results of 
Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011), who found very slightly positive or strongly 
negative coefficients for multiple book-builders. Thus, it can be concluded that although 
multiple book-builders used to result in lower gross spreads in European issues, this no 
longer holds true during my sample period of 2008-2018. Furthermore, based on the 
coefficients of the country and year dummies, I demonstrate that the results of my regression 
analysis are consistent over time and different national markets in Europe, even though a 
slight increase in the general levels of European gross spreads can be detected to occur over 
the sample period. 
My study is limited to the analysis of the gross spreads in the U.S. and Europe, 
and how different issue characteristics affect them. However, it does not focus on the reasons 
explaining the clustering of the gross spreads around certain integer-based levels. Moreover, 
my results are somewhat burdened by the possible bias resulting from the exclusion of a 
large amount of especially smaller and medium-sized European issues, for which gross 
spread data was not available. Additionally, some inaccuracy might result from the hand 
collection of the founder-manager sample. Also, only non-book-built IPOs and all issues 
smaller than $25 million U.S. dollars were excluded from the analysis in order to preserve 
comparability of my results with earlier studies, mainly with Abrahamson, Jenkinson and 
Jones (2011), and Chen and Ritter (2000). Finally, in comparison to other size classes, the 
‘Huge’ and ‘Unicorn’ classes include a low number of observations, which must be 
considered when evaluating the results of these classes. 
Suggested topics for future research include, for example, researching if the 
explanations for the clustering of gross spreads have changed relative to the studies by Chen 
and Ritter (2000), Hansen (2001), Torstila (2003) and Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones 
(2011). Also, further analysis of the significant negotiation power of the founder-managers 
affecting other areas of their companies’ businesses and the special characteristics of the 
‘unicorn’ companies would be interesting research topics. 
 52 
 
REFERENCES 
1. Abrahamson, Mark, Tim Jenkinson, and Howard Jones. "Why don’t US issuers 
demand European fees." (2011). 
2. Alphabet Inc. “14A Proxy Statement 2019”. Filed on SEC April 30, 2019.  
3. Bell, Daniel. "The coming of the post-industrial society." The Educational Forum. 
Vol. 40. No. 4. Taylor & Francis Group, 1976. 
4. Bloomberg L.P. Bloomberg News. https://www.bloomberg.com/  
5. Castells, Manuel. The rise of the network society. Vol. 12. John Wiley & Sons, 2011. 
6. Chen, Hsuan‐Chi, and Jay R. Ritter. "The seven percent solution." The Journal of 
Finance 55.3 (2000): 1105-1131. 
7. Chen, Hsuan‐Chi, Robert CW Fok, and Yu‐Jen Wang. "Why do underwriters charge 
low underwriting fees for initial public offerings in Taiwan?" Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting 33.7‐8 (2006): 979-1005. 
8. The Council of Institutional Investors. “Dual Class Companies List” Updated in 
September 2019. Accessed 22.11.2019. Available at 
https://www.cii.org/files/FINAL%20format%20Dual%20Class%20List%209-27-
19.pdf  
9. Facebook Inc. “14A Proxy Statement 2020”. Filed on SEC on April 10, 2020.  
10. FXSSI. “Most Valuable Companies in the World – 2020.” February 13, 2020. 
Accessed 25.4.2019. Available at https://fxssi.com/top-10-most-valuable-companies-
in-the-world  
11. Gompers, Paul A., Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick. "Extreme governance: An analysis 
of dual-class firms in the United States." The Review of Financial Studies 23.3 (2009): 
1051-1088. 
12. Hansen, Robert S. "Do investment banks compete in IPOs?: The advent of the “7% 
plus contract”." Journal of Financial Economics 59.3 (2001): 313-346. 
13. Internet World Stats. World Internet Users and 2020 Population Stats, March 3, 2020 
update. Accessed 25.4.2020. Available at https://internetworldstats.com/stats.htm  
14. Jain, Bharat A., and Omesh Kini. "The post‐issue operating performance of IPO 
firms." The journal of finance 49.5 (1994): 1699-1726. 
15. Jorgenson, Dale W. and Vu Khuong. “The ICT revolution, world economic growth, 
and policy issues.” Telecommunications Policy 40.5 (2016): 383-397  
 53 
 
16. Lee, Aileen. “Welcome To The Unicorn Club: Learning From Billion-Dollar 
Startups.” TechCrunch 2 Nov (2013). Accessed 22.11.2019. Available at 
https://techcrunch.com/2013/11/02/welcome-to-the-unicorn-club/  
17. Leslie, Christopher R. "Antitrust amnesty, game theory, and cartel stability." J. Corp. 
L. 31 (2005): 453. 
18. Ljungqvist, Alexander. "IPO underpricing." Handbook of Empirical Corporate 
Finance. Elsevier, 2007. 375-422. 
19. Lowry, Michelle, and G. William Schwert. "IPO market cycles: Bubbles or sequential 
learning?" The Journal of Finance 57.3 (2002): 1171-1200. 
20. Ritter, Jay R. "The costs of going public." (1987). 
21. Ritter, Jay R. "Differences between European and American IPO markets." European 
financial management 9.4 (2003): 421-434. 
22. Ritter, Jay R., and Ivo Welch. "A review of IPO activity, pricing, and allocations." The 
journal of Finance 57.4 (2002): 1795-1828. 
23. Sheppard, Kevin. "Financial econometrics notes." University of Oxford (2018). 
24. Smart, Scott B., and Chad J. Zutter. "Control as a motivation for underpricing: a 
comparison of dual and single-class IPOs." Journal of Financial Economics 69.1 
(2003): 85-110. 
25. Snap Inc. “Form 10-K Annual Report 2019”. Filed on SEC on February 5, 2020. 
26. Statista. Number of monthly active Facebook users worldwide as of 4th quarter 2019 
(in millions). Accessed 25.4.2020. Available at 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-
worldwide/  
27. Student. (1908). The probable error of a mean. Biometrika, 1-25. 
28. Theil, Henri. "Economic forecasts and policy." (1961). Amsterdam: North. p. 213. 
29. Torstila, Sami. "What determines IPO gross spreads in Europe?." European Financial 
Management 7.4 (2001): 523-541. 
30. Torstila, Sami. "The clustering of IPO gross spreads: International evidence." Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38.3 (2003): 673-694 
31. The United States Census Bureau. U.S. and World Population Clock. Accessed 
25.4.2020. Available at https://www.census.gov/popclock/  
32. The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Filings. 
https://www.sec.gov 
 54 
 
APPENDIX 
List of Appendices 
A1. Data filtering process ......................................................................................................... 55 
A2. National distribution of IPOs based on domicile nations .................................................. 56 
A3. IPOs with founder-manager flagging ................................................................................ 57 
A4. IPOs with unicorn flagging ............................................................................................... 61  
 55 
 
A1. Data filtering process. 
Appendix 1 describes the data filtering process applied to the raw data obtained from the Securities and Data 
Company (SDC) Platinum database in detail. Only book-built IPOs were included to preserve direct comparability 
to earlier results, mainly to Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011). Similarly to both Chen and Ritter (2000) 
and Abrahamson, Jenkinson and Jones (2011)), small IPOs under $25 million are excluded and some standard 
exclusions are also made, including e.g. SPACs and REITs. 
 
  
All 4515 U.S. and European IPOs from 2008 to 2018 
Full sample of 1450 IPOs 
1) Include only book-built IPOs 
2) ‘Cut-off’: leave out IPOs under $25 million 
3) ‘Standard exclusions’ of IPO literature 
4515 
3787 
2882 
2472 
1450 
(!) Remove all observations for which 
gross spread data was not available 
 
The issue of missing data plagues almost 
exclusively European IPOs: of the 1022 
missing data points, 984 were European 
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A2. National distribution of IPOs based on domicile nations. 
Appendix 2 presents the national distribution of the 1450 IPOs included in the full sample, based on their domicile 
nations. The domicile nations of the IPOs are defined according to the ‘Nation’ variable in the SDC Platinum 
database. The left pie chart divides the sample into U.S. and European categories. In the right pie chart, the 
European IPOs are further categorised based on the domicile nations inside Europe. The ‘Other’ category of the 
right pie chart includes the (European) IPOs of companies that are not domiciled in the following European nations 
of United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Russian Federation or France.  
United States
1178
United Kingdom
78
Germany
34
Netherlands
22
Russia
13
France
8
Other
117
Europe
272
United States United Kingdom Germany Netherlands Russian Federation France Other
  
 
A3. IPOs with founder-manager flagging. 
Appendix 3 presents the 84 IPOs with Founder-Manager flagging (companies under the effective control of founder-managers), by providing additional information about the 
IPOs included. ‘Issuer’ lists the companies going public, ‘Business Description’ the main businesses of the companies (according to SDC), ‘Nation’ the domicile nations of the 
companies, ‘Exchange’ the exchanges on which the issues are listed, ‘Gross spread’ the gross spreads (as a percentage of the total amount of proceeds), ‘Proceeds’ the total 
amount of proceeds collected in the IPOs. Moreover, dummy values for ‘unicorn’ and technology companies controlled by founder-managers are provided for the listed IPOs.  
Year Issuer Business Description Nation Exchange Gross 
spread, % 
Proceeds 
($ Million) 
F-M-T Unicorn 
2008 Visa Inc Provide electronic payment services U.S. NYSE 2.80 17864 1 1 
2009 Hyatt Hotels Corp Own and operate hotels U.S. NYSE 5.12 950 0 0 
2010 Ironwood Pharmaceuticals 
Inc 
Manufacture and develop pharmaceutical products U.S. NASDQ 7.00 188 1 0 
2010 Tesla Motors Inc Manufacture electric automobiles U.S. NASDQ 6.50 226 0 0 
2010 Ameresco Inc Provide energy management services U.S. NYSE 7.00 87 0 0 
2011 LinkedIn Corp Provide online networking services U.S. NYSE 7.00 353 1 0 
2011 Yandex NV Provide internet services Russia NASDQ 5.00 1304 1 1 
2011 Zillow Inc Provide online re-information services U.S. NASDQ 7.00 69 1 0 
2011 Groupon Inc Provide online marketing services U.S. NASDQ 6.00 700 1 0 
2011 Angie's List Inc Provide online reviews services U.S. NASDQ 7.00 114 1 0 
2011 Jive Software Inc Develop social business software U.S. NASDQ 7.00 161 1 0 
2011 Michael Kors Holdings Ltd Manufacture, wholesale of men's, women's clothing U.S. NYSE 5.00 944 0 0 
2011 Zynga Inc Provide online social gaming services U.S. NASDQ 3.25 1000 1 1 
2012 Yelp Inc Provide internet search engine services U.S. NYSE 7.00 107 1 0 
2012 Demandware Inc Develop internet software U.S. NYSE 7.00 88 1 0 
2012 Annie's Inc Natural and organic food U.S. NYSE 7.00 95 0 0 
2012 Tilly's Inc Retailer of apparels U.S. NYSE 7.00 124 0 0 
2012 Facebook Inc Internet service provider U.S. NASDQ 1.10 16007 1 1 
2012 ServiceNow Inc Develop internet software U.S. NYSE 7.00 210 1 0 
2012 Globus Medical Inc Manufacture medical devices and instruments U.S. NYSE 7.00 100 1 0 
2012 Workday Inc Provide software solutions services U.S. NYSE 6.00 637 1 0 
2012 MegaFon Cellular Communications Russia MICEX 1.00 1691 1 1 
2012 MegaFon Cellular Communications Russia LONDN 1.00 1691 1 1  
Data Source: Securities and Data Company (SDC) Platinum database.
  
 
A3. IPOs with founder-manager flagging. (CONTINUED) 
Appendix 3 presents the 84 IPOs with Founder-Manager flagging (companies under the effective control of founder-managers), by providing additional information about the 
IPOs included. ‘Issuer’ lists the companies going public, ‘Business Description’ the main businesses of the companies (according to SDC), ‘Nation’ the domicile nations of the 
companies, ‘Exchange’ the exchanges on which the issues are listed, ‘Gross spread’ the gross spreads (as a percentage of the total amount of proceeds), ‘Proceeds’ the total 
amount of proceeds collected in the IPOs. Moreover, dummy values for ‘unicorn’ and technology companies controlled by founder-managers are provided for the listed IPOs. 
Year Issuer Business Description Nation Exchange Gross 
spread, % 
Proceeds 
($ Million) 
F-M-T Unicorn 
2013 William Lyon Homes Inc Construction company U.S. NYSE 7.00 218 0 0 
2013 Tableau Software Inc Develop pre-packaged software U.S. NYSE 7.00 254 1 0 
2013 Noodles & Co Own and operate restaurants U.S. NASDQ 7.00 96 0 0 
2013 NRG Yield Inc Own and operate renewable energy U.S. NYSE 5.50 431 0 0 
2013 Ringcentral Inc Develop communication software U.S. NYSE 7.00 98 1 0 
2013 RE/MAX Holdings Inc Provide real estate brokerage services U.S. NYSE 10.34 220 0 0 
2013 Veeva Systems Inc Develop CRM content management software U.S. NYSE 11.20 261 1 0 
2013 AMC Ent. Holdings Inc Motion picture theatres U.S. NYSE 5.25 332 0 0 
2014 EP Energy Corp Oil and natural gas exploration and production U.S. NYSE 4.50 704 0 0 
2014 Castlight Health Inc Develop health care software U.S. NYSE 7.00 178 1 0 
2014 Phibro Animal Health Corp Pharmaceutical preparation manufacturing U.S. NASDQ 6.75 191 1 0 
2014 Moelis & Co Investment advice U.S. NYSE 7.00 163 0 0 
2014 GoPro Inc Photographic equipment manufacturing U.S. NASDQ 6.00 427 0 0 
2014 Townsquare Media Inc Own and operate radio stations U.S. NYSE 7.00 92 1 0 
2014 Medley Management Inc Investment advice U.S. NYSE 7.00 108 0 0 
2014 Wayfair Inc Electronic shopping U.S. NYSE 6.00 319 1 0 
2014 Workiva Inc Software publishers U.S. NYSE 7.00 101 1 0 
2015 Box Inc Software publishers U.S. NYSE 7.00 175 1 0 
2015 Inovalon Holdings Inc Data processing, hosting and related services U.S. NASDQ 5.93 600 1 0 
2015 Fitbit Inc Electronic equipment manufacturing U.S. NYSE 6.00 732 1 0 
2015 MINDBODY Inc Software publishers U.S. NYSE 7.00 100 1 0 
2015 AppFolio Inc Software publishers U.S. NASDQ 7.00 74 1 0 
2015 Live Oak Bancshares Inc Commercial banking U.S. NASDQ 5.18 82 0 0 
Data Source: Securities and Data Company (SDC) Platinum database. 
  
 
A3. IPOs with founder-manager flagging. (CONTINUED) 
Appendix 3 presents the 84 IPOs with Founder-Manager flagging (companies under the effective control of founder-managers), by providing additional information about the 
IPOs included. ‘Issuer’ lists the companies going public, ‘Business Description’ the main businesses of the companies (according to SDC), ‘Nation’ the domicile nations of the 
companies, ‘Exchange’ the exchanges on which the issues are listed, ‘Gross spread’ the gross spreads (as a percentage of the total amount of proceeds), ‘Proceeds’ the total 
amount of proceeds collected in the IPOs. Moreover, dummy values for ‘unicorn’ and technology companies controlled by founder-managers are provided for the listed IPOs. 
Year Issuer Business Description Nation Exchange Gross 
spread, % 
Proceeds 
($ Million) 
F-M-T Unicorn 
2015 Houlihan Lokey Inc Investment banking and securities dealing U.S. NYSE 6.75 221 0 0 
2015 Pure Storage Inc Manufacture data storage equipment U.S. NYSE 6.00 425 1 0 
2015 First Data Corp Financial transactions processing U.S. NYSE 3.25 2560 1 1 
2015 Square Inc Data processing, hosting and related services U.S. NYSE 5.50 243 1 0 
2015 Match Group Inc Custom computer programming services U.S. NASDQ 5.50 400 1 0 
2015 Duluth Holdings Inc Clothing accessories stores U.S. NASDQ 7.00 80 0 0 
2016 SecureWorks Corp Other computer related services U.S. NASDQ 7.00 112 1 0 
2016 Reata Pharmaceuticals Inc Pharmaceutical preparation manufacturing U.S. NASDQ 7.00 61 1 0 
2016 Twilio Inc Software publishers U.S. NYSE 7.00 150 1 0 
2016 The Trade Desk Inc Marketing consulting services U.S. NASDQ 7.00 84 0 0 
2016 Apptio Inc Software publishers U.S. NASDQ 1.40 96 1 0 
2016 Nutanix Inc Software publishers U.S. NASDQ 7.00 238 1 0 
2017 Laureate Education Inc Own and operate universities U.S. NASDQ 5.00 490 0 0 
2017 Hamilton Lane Inc Investment advice U.S. NASDQ 7.00 190 0 0 
2017 Snap Inc Software reproducing U.S. NYSE 2.50 3400 1 1 
2017 Alteryx Inc Develop internet software U.S. NYSE 7.54 117 1 0 
2017 Schneider National Inc Provide truckload and intermodal services U.S. NYSE 5.75 550 0 0 
2017 Okta Inc Software publishers U.S. NASDQ 7.00 187 1 0 
2017 Carvana Co New car dealers U.S. NYSE 7.00 225 0 0 
2017 Appian Corp Develop business process management software U.S. NASDQ 7.00 75 1 0 
2017 Altice USA Inc Wired telecommunications carriers U.S. NYSE 3.30 1918 1 1 
Data Source: Securities and Data Company (SDC) Platinum database. 
  
 
A3. IPOs with founder-manager flagging. (CONTINUED) 
Appendix 3 presents the 84 IPOs with Founder-Manager flagging (companies under the effective control of founder-managers), by providing additional information about the 
IPOs included. ‘Issuer’ lists the companies going public, ‘Business Description’ the main businesses of the companies (according to SDC), ‘Nation’ the domicile nations of the 
companies, ‘Exchange’ the exchanges on which the issues are listed, ‘Gross spread’ the gross spreads (as a percentage of the total amount of proceeds), ‘Proceeds’ the total 
amount of proceeds collected in the IPOs. Moreover, dummy values for ‘unicorn’ and technology companies controlled by founder-managers are provided for the listed IPOs. 
Year Issuer Business Description Nation Exchange Gross 
spread, % 
Proceeds 
($ Million) 
F-M-T Unicorn 
2017 Blue Apron Holdings Inc Mail-order houses U.S. NYSE 5.50 300 1 0 
2017 Roku Inc Cable and other subscription programming U.S. NASDQ 7.00 219 1 0 
2017 Switch Inc Custom computer programming services U.S. NYSE 5.50 531 1 0 
2017 Cargurus Inc Data processing, hosting and related services U.S. NASDQ 7.00 150 1 0 
2017 MongoDB Software reproducing U.S. NASDQ 7.00 192 1 0 
2017 Altair Engineering Inc Develop engineering software U.S. NASDQ 7.00 156 1 0 
2017 Stitch Fix Inc Mail-order houses U.S. NASDQ 5.17 120 0 0 
2017 Newmark Group Inc Offices of real estate agents and brokers U.S. NASDQ 5.50 280 0 0 
2018 Victory Capital Holdings Inc Investment advice U.S. NASDQ 6.00 152 0 0 
2018 Dropbox Inc Provide information retrieval services U.S. NASDQ 4.45 756 1 0 
2018 Zuora Inc Provide relationship business management solutions U.S. NYSE 7.00 154 1 0 
2018 Pivotal Software Inc Develop software U.S. NYSE 5.50 555 1 0 
2018 Smartsheet Inc Develop work management software U.S. NYSE 7.00 175 1 0 
2018 Construction Partners Inc Provide road and highway construction services U.S. NASDQ 7.00 135 0 0 
2018 Pluralsight LLC Provide online training services U.S. NASDQ 7.00 311 1 0 
2018 GreenSky Inc Software publishers U.S. NASDQ 5.00 874 1 0 
2018 US Xpress Enterprises Inc Trucking services U.S. NYSE 6.25 289 0 0 
Data Source: Securities and Data Company (SDC) Platinum database.
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A4. IPOs with unicorn flagging. 
Appendix 4 presents the 23 IPOs with Unicorn flagging (Total IPO proceeds collected {≥ $1000 Million} and 
Technology dummy value = 1), by providing additional information about the IPOs included. ‘Issuer’ lists the 
companies going public, ‘High Tech Industry’ the (hi-tech) industries of the companies (according to SDC), 
‘Nation’ the domicile nations of the companies, ‘Exchange’ the exchanges on which the issues are listed, ‘G.s.’ 
the gross spreads as a percentage of the total amount of proceeds collected in the IPOs, ‘Proc.’ the total amount of 
proceeds collected in the IPOs. Moreover, the dummy values for privatisations (‘Priv.) and offerings of 
(technology) companies controlled by founder-managers (‘FMT’) are provided for listed IPOs.  
Year Issuer High Tech Industry Nation Exchange 
G.s. 
,% 
Proc., $ 
Million 
Priv. FMT 
2008 Visa Inc Electronic payment services U.S. NYSE 2.80 17864 0 1 
2008 Turk Telekom. AS Telecommunication services Turkey ISTBL 0.09 1901 1 0 
2008 Turk Telekom. AS Telecommunication services Turkey ISTBL 0.09 1901 1 0 
2009 Verisk Analytics Inc Data processing services 
 
U.S. NASDQ 4.00 1876 0 0 
2010 Amadeus IT Holding SA Other computer services Spain MADRD 1.50 1732 0 0 
2011 HCA Holdings Inc Healthcare technology services U.S. NYSE 3.63 3786 0 0 
2011 Nielsen Holdings NV Data processing services U.S. NYSE 4.50 1643 0 0 
2011 Yandex NV Internet services & software Russia NASDQ 5.00 1304 0 1 
2011 Zynga Inc Other software (incl. Games) U.S. NASDQ 3.25 1000 0 1 
2012 Facebook Inc Internet services & software U.S. NASDQ 1.10 16007 0 1 
2012 MegaFon Cellular communication Russia MICEX 1.00 1691 0 0 
2012 MegaFon Cellular communication Russia LONDN 1.00 1691 0 0 
2012 Telefonica Deutschland Telecommunication services Germany FRANK 2.50 1626 0 0 
2012 Ziggo NV Internet services & software Netherlands EUROA 1.50 1064 0 0 
2013 Zoetis Inc Pharmaceuticals research U.S. NYSE 3.70 2239 0 0 
2013 Twitter Inc Internet services & software U.S. NYSE 3.25 1820 0 0 
2014 Altice Sa Telecommunication services Luxembourg EUROA 1.50 1760 0 1 
2014 IMS Health Holdings Inc Internet services & software U.S. NYSE 4.50 1300 0 0 
2015 First Data Corp Data processing services U.S. NYSE 3.25 2560 0 1 
2015 Scout24 AG Internet services & software Germany FRANK 2.38 1127 0 0 
2017 Snap Inc Applications software U.S. NYSE 2.50 3400 0 1 
2017 Altice USA Inc Telecommunication services U.S. NYSE 3.3 1918 0 1 
2018 Elanco Animal Health Inc Pharmaceuticals research U.S. NYSE 4.40 1510 0 0 
Data source: Securities and Data Company (SDC) Platinum database. 
